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THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON RESUSCITATED
James P. Madigan
In this Article, James Madigan examines the role ofpublic reason in a
democratic government, including what views should play a role in determining
public reason. Madigan criticizes John Rawls for including comprehensive
views in constitutional debates, and argues that only reasons grounded in
political values should be used when debating constitutional issues and
fundamental rights.
I stand for the separation of church and state, and the reason that I
stand for that is the same reason that I believe our forefathers did. It
is not there to protect religion from the grasp of government, but to
protect our government from the grasp of religious fanaticism. I may
be an atheist, but that does not mean I do not go to church. I do go to
church. The church Igo to is the one that emancipated the slaves. It
gave women the right to vote. It gave us every freedom that we hold
dear.
My church is this very chapel of democracy that we sit in together,
and I do not need God to tell me what are my moral absolutes. I need
my heart, my brain, and this church.
- THE CONTENDER (DreamWorks Pictures 2000)
I. INTRODUCTION
For philosophers and legal scholars who wonder whether the general public
could ever understand or apply academic ideas about public reason, this excerpt
from a recent critically acclaimed film should prove heartening. Without the help
of complex theoretic tests, these lines capture the essence of an ideal democratic
deliberation: decision-makers relying on common political values rather than
unknowable truths from the heavens.
In the past decade, John Rawls has become the central architect of an idea of
public reason. The motivating force for his move from A Theory of Justice' to
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PoliticalLiberalism2 was a recognition that modem democratic society was marked
by reasonable pluralism - a panoply of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. The project for political liberals has been to come up with a method of
governance in which coercive state power treats citizens as free and equal, and so
a central problem is how to make decisions without relying on religious
comprehensive doctrines while at the same time securing space for their articulated
existence.
Public reason, in one form or anoer, provides the solution. Briefly put, it is
the decision-making methodology of the citizenry and its government (public
reason) consisting of the principles and values that gird or justify particular
decisions (public reasons).4 The only way to make decisions that do not exalt some
comprehensive doctrines over others is to ensure that the public's reason is drawn
from shared political conceptions ofjustice' Thus, Rawls originally envisioned his
own version of public reason as exclusive: Only reasons drawing on these political
values could be introduced in debates governed by public reason.6 But from that
original impulse, he capitulated. He went on to construct an idea of public reason
that permitted the introduction of comprehensive views along with public reasons
into political debates.' Most scholars' versions of public reason range from such
partial inclusion to full outright reliance on comprehensive doctrines.'
This Article is a critique ofRawls's surrender to the inclusion of comprehensive
views within the confines of deliberation governed by public reason. My aim is to
resuscitate an exclusive view, by which I mean that only reasons grounded in
political values should be introduced when debating constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice such as fundamental rights. Part DI traces the idea of public
reason in Rawls's work focusing on his recent tinkering with the issues of how and
2 JOHN RAWLS, POLrTICAL LIBERAUSM (1993) [hereinafter PL].
3 Id. at xviii-xix. A comprehensive doctrine refers to a moral conception of the good
life. A conception is general when it refers to a wide range of subjects, and comprehensive
when it includes ideals of personal virtue premised on a notion of what is of value in a
human life. Id. at 174-75.
4 I will track the more elaborate definition of public reason from Rawls in Part II.
s A political conception is like other moral doctrines except that its scope is much
narrower, devoted solely to society's basic structure of political, social, and economic
institutions. PL, supra note 2, at 11, 175. It exists "freestanding," apart from any
comprehensive doctrine, though it can (and hopefully will) fit in like a module to various
comprehensive views. Id. at 12. Finally, and most significantly for my discussion, its content
derives from values implicit in the public's political culture. Id. at 13-14.
6 Id. at 247 n.36. Rawls only applies his idea of public reason to debates over
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Deliberations over ordinary political
matters are not covered. Id. at 214-15, 227-30.
7 See id. at 1-1vi; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
765 (1997) [hereinafter IPRR].
' See Part VI, infra.
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when comprehensive ideas may enter such debates.' Part M questions the
workability of Rawls's "proviso" that comprehensive views may come in as long
as citizens follow them up with public reasons drawn on political values.'" Part IV
challenges the notion that the justification of a constitutional decision is unchanged
by the presence of comprehensive views accompanying public reasons." Part V
identifies a listeners' dilemma in Rawlsian public reason that exposes citizens to
comprehensive doctrinal "preaching," but withholds from them the ability to
criticize the merits of such comprehensive views. 2 Finally, Part VI surveys some
other scholars' versions of public reason and tries to defend an exclusive view
against those other views.'"
This paper aims to persuade those with views akin or sympathetic to Rawlsian
political liberalism. The bulk of the argument is framed as a critique of the wide
view of public reason. Hopefully, the considerations supporting an exclusive view
will be not only identifiable within, but also severable from, that critique. To the
extent that my argument appears too reactionary or too embedded in Political
Liberalism, I would offer two exculpatory pleas. First, nearly all of the current
scholarship on this subject situates itself in relation to Rawls. And second,
criticizing so eminent a philosopher is not a task to be taken lightly. I have tried to
provide a more precise and complete treatment of his views on public reason than
is usually offered, and that is driven mainly by admiration for his philosophic
endeavor.
II. EVOLUTION OF RAWLS'S PUBLIC REASON
A. The Concept
To understand Political Liberalism's version of public reason, one must first
recognize that John Rawls's understanding of the subject has evolved quite a bit.
By tracing the changes in his vision, we can identify the concerns pushing him
toward the inclusion of comprehensive views within political deliberation. For
those unfamiliar with Rawls or the notion of public reason, this section will lay out
the ideal and explain how it has changed so far."'
9 See infra notes 14-70 and accompanying text.
10 See PL, supra note 2, at li-lii; IPRR, supra note 7, at 784; infra notes 71-122 and
accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 161-211 and accompanying text.
'4 Readers familiar with Rawls's version of public reason and its permutations might
want to skip most of this part. However, the end of this section takes up serious ambiguities
in Rawls's current position that have not been plumbed in prior scholarship and that later
serve as the basis for my critique of Rawls and my defense of an exclusive view of public
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Like any organization, a political society must have some way of enunciating
goals and prioritizing values so that it can create alternative plans and select among
them. That process, and the capacity of members to engage in it, is an organized
body's reason. Rawls then distinguishes public reason from the reason of private
associations such as churches, universities or families, and he sees a special role for
public reason in a democracy: "[Ilts nature and content is public, being given by
the ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice, and
conducted open to view on that basis."' 5 .
While political decisions are all public, as such, Rawls reserves the idea of
public reason to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice only. 6
Ordinary political decisions that do not touch upon these fundamental concerns are
not bound by the dictates of public reason. Why not? The answer lies in its
restrictive content. Only certain types of reasons are public, and these alone are the
basis for questions of governmental design, equality of opportunity, basic liberties,
and the like. 7 While such public reasons might well be potential grounds for the
countless other political decisions that must be made in a democracy, Rawls is
content to limit his restrictive ideal to the most fundamental matters." Though he
does not express it quite this way, one can imagine that, if a proper balance of
fundamental equality and liberty are secured via the shared values within the scope
of public reason, then the resultant rights of the people probably shield them from
any political decisions that would seriously transgress those values. 9
Thus, of critical importance is the realm or content of reasons that may
legitimately ground public decisions on issues of constitutional and fundamental
justice. A family of liberal political conceptions of justice provide the content of
public reason.20 They are political conceptions in that they: (1) apply to basic
political and social institutions; (2) are presented independent of any comprehensive
or religious doctrine; and (3) can be drawn from ideas implicit in the public political
reason.
'5 PL, supra note 2, at 213.
16 See id. at 214, 227-30.
17 See id.
18 See id.
9 Cf id. at 230 (commenting that as "long as there is firm agreement on the
constitutional essentials and established political procedures are reasonably regarded as
fair," cooperation between citizens is maintainable).
20 IPRR, supra note 7, at 773. Note that Rawls emphasizes in this later article that there
is not one single political conception that formulates public reason's content. This was
implicit in parts of Political Liberalism, PL, supra note 2, at 226, despite his reference to "a
'political conception ofjustice,"' id. at 223 (emphasis added). These conceptions are liberal
in that they: (1) list basic liberties; (2) prioritize them; and (3) ensure to citizens adequate
primary goods, or all-purpose means to effectively use their freedoms. Id. at 223; IPRR,
supra note 7, at 774.
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culture.2 Principles and values drawn from these conceptions become a
justificatory realm, as it were - a body of reasons that justify decisions on
fundamental matters.22
Public reason is not merely a garden of rationales, however. It operates like
rules of evidence to delineate proper reasons by distinguishing them from non-
public ones.23 Non-public reasons come in various sorts, as they are employed in
the diverse associations and organizations of civic society, or "background culture,"
as Rawls calls it.24 These reasons are not public because we cannot reasonably
expect for them to be endorsed by those who do not subscribe to the particular
comprehensive doctrine from which they come. What distinguishes public reason
from non-public reasons is not simply that its purview is the public political culture,
but. also that its content springs from shared values borne out of political
conceptions of justice.
And so "[t]o engage in public reason is to appeal to one of these political
conceptions.., when debating fundamental political questions."'25 The point of the
ideal is for citizens to discuss such issues within a framework of reasons that others
could reasonably be expected to endorse.26 That expectation is founded on two
considerations. First, public reasons are those drawn from shared political values
and methods of reasoning that rest on plain truths and common sense. Second,
Rawls insists that each person must have some criterion of reciprocity by which to
determine what principles and guidelines could be accepted by other free and equal
citizens as reasonable. 2 The upshot is that citizens must recognize ex ante that
some reasons are not public because they fail to meet the criterion by which we
might say that others could be expected to endorse the reasons.29 Such reasons
might not be reasonable either because they fail to treat other citizens as free and
equal, or because they rest on a comprehensive doctrine that others do not share.
The ideal of public reason, if realized, then, is a dynamic social force that
cultivates democratic citizenship by "taking people as a just and well-ordered
society would encourage them to be."3 Essential to deliberative democracy, Rawls
21 PL, supra note 2, at 223; IPRR, supra note 7, at 776.
22 PL, supra note 2, at 224; IPRR, supra note 7, at 777.
3 See PL, supra note 2, at 218, 221; IPRR, supra note 7, at 786, 805 n.95.
2 PL, supra note 2, at 220.
2 IPRR, supra note 7, at 776.
26 PL, supra note 2, at 226.
27 Id. at 224-26.
28 Id. at li, 226; IPRR, supra note 7, at 773.
29 Note here that to expect other citizens to consider our reasons reasonable does not
mean that they will also draw the same conclusion or support our particular end. The idea
is simply to ensure that a reason given in favor of a particular conclusion is in fact one that
could be endorsed because it draws on shared political values.
30 PL, supra note 2, at 213.
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
claims, is a "knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public
reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct."3' Though essential,
citizens have only a moral (not a legal) duty of civility toward one another to follow
its dictates. 2 That moral obligation pushes citizens to advocate and vote - and to
explain their positions and votes - using the political values of public reason at
least for matters of constitutional import. Civility also involves a willingness to
listen to others.3 Before focusing on Rawls's evolving notion of the limits of
citizens' public reason (or the degree to which comprehensive views may infiltrate),
it is useful to see how it applies to government actors.
While the ideal of public reason is realized whenever citizens or government
actors follow public reason in their actions and explanations, Rawls's idea of public
reason has a more narrow, particularized scope.34 Like the general discussion of
public reason above, the idea applies to fundamental questions with a content
derived exclusively from reasonable political conceptions of justice marked by a
criterion of reciprocity. The idea only applies to certain actors, however, within
what Rawls calls the public political forum, which has three parts: the discourse of
(1) judges; (2) government officials; and (3) political candidates.3
This idea-ideal distinction is both helpful and confusing. It is useful in that the
idea has specific features - namely, the issues it covers, the persons obliged by it,
its content, its deliberative discussion, and its criterion of reciprocity.36 The ideal
is realized whenever the idea is followed. The relationship of citizens to the ideal
is the potentially confusing part, both because it is hard to follow how private
citizens meet the ideal if they are not covered by the idea, and because the way
citizens meet the ideal is related to how judges, officials, and candidates do so (who
are all covered by the idea). In his most recent work, Rawls explains that citizens
fulfill the ideal of public reason when they act or deliberate according to bounds of
political values during discussion of fundamental rights. 7 They support the idea
of public reason by holding government actors accountable for following it.38
B. The Limits
With this account laid out, we can now consider the part of Political Liberalism
3' IPRR, supra note 7, at 772.
3 PL, supra note 2, at 217.
33 Id. at 217, 253.
"4 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 768-69.
31 Id. at 767. Judges' contributions to the public political forum lie in their opinions,
whereas candidates are responsible for partyplatforms, campaign workers' speech, and their
own public oratory. Id.
36 Id.
31 Id. at 769.
38 Id.
[Vol. 10:3
PUBLIC REASON RESUSCITATED
that has undergone the most change - the limits of public reason. An exclusive
view of public reason would hold that in public political debate on fundamental
matters, no reasons could be given that were explicitly based on comprehensive
doctrines. Only public reasons drawing on political values that others could
reasonably be expected to endorse may be introduced. This was the version to
which Rawls was originally drawn as he moved from comprehensive to political
liberalism.39
But instead, Rawls opted for what he called an inclusive view that permitted
citizens to introduce comprehensive doctrinal reasons in certain situations.4 ° Driven
primarily by a desire to make the ideal of public reason accord with the experience
of antebellum abolitionists and Martin Luther King, Jr., Rawls permitted the
introduction of reasons based on religious doctrines.4 His rationale was that the
pre-Civil War and Civil Rights eras were both unjust societies that could not be
considered well-ordered given the deep disagreement on constitutional essentials.
The introduction of Christian rationales to secure the freedom and equality of
African Americans actually made the societies more just and thereby strengthened
the ideal of public reason.42
The inclusive view was meant to provide flexibility. While a well-ordered
society might indeed be best suited by an exclusive view of public reason, Rawls
recognized that societies marked by serious fundamental disputes might not be
capable of progressing toward agreement by reference to shared political values
alone.43 Thus, historical and social conditions would dictate the degree to which
public reason should operate exclusively (on political values alone) or inclusively
(with comprehensive doctrines).'M An inclusive view would allow citizens to
"present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their
comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of
public reason itself."'45
By the time PoliticalLiberalism went to paperback, Rawls was dissatisfied with
the inclusive view. He dropped the conditions on the introduction of
comprehensive views: no longer would society need to be unjust or would the
39 PL, supra note 2, at 247 n.36.
41 Id. at 247.
"' See id. at 248.
42 Id. at 247-51.
41 Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 251.
4 Id. at 247. Initially, Rawls's assumption sounds right because it makes little sense to
rely on a shared set of political values if those values are in fact highly contested and not yet
agreed upon. Alternatively, one could say that such societies lack a complete set of public
reasons because profound disagreement over fundamental matters might signal that no
shared political values yet cover certain questions.
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introduction of such views need to help make it stronger.46 Instead, comprehensive
doctrines could be introduced at any time, so long as reasons from a political
conception that would support the same argument were introduced in due course.
Rawls called this the proviso and made it the defining trait of "the wide view of
public reason."'47 Still preoccupied with the abolitionists and the civil rights
movement, he took solace in the fact that, whether or not these noble Americans
ever satisfied the proviso, they certainly could have done so48 - presumably by
reference to political values like individual liberty, the basic equality of all persons,
and the overarching right to pursue happiness. The wide view with its proviso
would show citizens how allegiances to the political conception were rooted in
particular comprehensive views.49
It was not long before Rawls felt the need to say more. The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited was not really a change, but instead an attempt to clarify the idea
and the ideal given the new wide view."0 Pertinent to my interests, Rawls set up a
discussion of the wide view by considering the relationship between religion and
democracy.
The compatibility of religious doctrines with a political conception must occur
for the right reasons; religions cannot accept democratic government as a modus
vivendi alone." In other words, a religion cannot embrace toleration merely
because it lacks the power to impose its will. Nor can it honor freedom of
conscience only up to the point at which it might lose influence." Instead, religious
comprehensive views - like their secular counterparts - must affirm a political
conception as the balance of equal liberties for its own adherents as well as others.
People of faith must recognize the legitimacy of law even where their own religion
might lose ground, and they must not attempt to use law to establish the hegemony
of their own comprehensive views." The exercise of public reason is a
manifestation of this deeper commitment to democracy. Sometimes this involves
reasoning by conjecture, where we suggest to others how, given what we know of
their comprehensive views, they could still endorse a reasonable political
46 Id. at lii.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
48 See id. at Iii n.27 and accompanying text.
49 Id. at lii.
" The article recounted the concepts discussed above and offered a new discussion of
the family's dual roles as part of the basic structure and the background culture - a
response to feminist critiques regarding the lack of treatment given the family in Political
Liberalism. See IPRR, supra note 7, at § 5, 787-94 (take particular note of page 787, note
58).
51 Id. at 780.
52 Id. at781.
51 Id. at 782.
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conception of justice.'
Of course, such forays into comprehensive views might not ever come into
public political debates were it not for the proviso. Interestingly, Rawls no longer
refers to the wide view of public reason, but instead refers to "the wide view of
public political culture."" One explanation for this slight terminological change
would be to situate the wide view with its proviso solely within the ideal of public
reason. This would remove the proviso from the idea of public reason and thereby
keep comprehensive views out of its domain: the public political forum, which
includes the discourse of judges, government officials, and candidates. After all,
Rawls still uses the terms public political forum and public political culture
distinctly.56
This explanation proves difficult, however, given the definition of public
political culture in PoliticalLiberalism incorporated into Rawls's later discussion.
In both works, Rawls uses public political culture to contrast its distinct and
separate sphere from that of the background culture." "This public culture
comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public
traditions of their interpretation (including those ofthe judiciary) as well as historic
texts and documents that are common knowledge." 9 Political institutions and
judicial interpretations are clearly within the idea of public reason. Taken together,
Rawls's description of the wide view suggests that the proviso - which is the
defining trait of the wide view - will operate within the discourse of judges,
government officials, and candidates. Thus, the public reason grounding decisions
over fundamental matters will include comprehensive views as long as they are
buttressed by proper political reasons.
To be fair, this point never comes through explicitly in Rawls's discussion. On
the one hand, he repeatedly referred to "citizens" when he first introduced his
inclusive view60 and then when he switched to the wide view.6 His defense of the
proviso is entirely worded in the good it does for citizens to have mutual knowledge
Id. at 783, 786-87.
" Compare PL, supra note 2, at lii, with IPRR, supra note 7, at 783.
56 Compare IPRR, supra note 7, at 767, with IPRR, supra note 7, at 783-84.
s See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784 n.48; PL, supra note 2, at 13-14.
s PL, supra note 2, at 14; IPRR, supra note 7, at 784. Interestingly for my purposes, the
definition of public culture is immediately followed with an attempt to separate it from
comprehensive views: "Comprehensive doctrines of all kinds - religious, philosophical,
and moral - belong to what we may call the 'background culture' of civil society. This is
the culture of the social, not of the political." PL, supra note 2, at 14. Here we see the seeds
of the tension that develops when Rawls capitulates 233 pages later to embrace
comprehensive doctrinal reasons into an inclusive view, and then again two years later, with
the wide view.
" PL, supra note 2, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 247.
61 Id. at Iii.
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of one another's comprehensive doctrines.6 2 But the definition of public political
culture is surely inclusive (dare I use the word) of governmental actors, and Rawls
asks, but does not answer, the question of "on whom does the obligation to honor
[the proviso] fall?" 63 He does emphasize "political discussion" as the operative
realm of the wide view,' perhaps enabling him to permit comprehensive views with
the proviso in government decisions and elections that touch on fundamental
matters, but to rely exclusively on public reasons in judges' opinions, which are not
political discourse.65 Of course, even that reading does not necessarily prevent the
operation of the proviso in lawyers' arguments to a court or during judicial
deliberation.
In the end, the main reason that Rawls leaves this issue unresolved is also the
best evidence for thinking that the wide view does apply to the idea of public reason
(discussion of fundamental matters by government officials, candidates, and judges)
as well as to citizens' discourse. Basically, he thinks the inclusion of
comprehensive views never changes the result: "It is important also to observe that
the introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doctrines,
provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content ofjustification
in public reason itself." There would be no purpose for this sentence were it not
for the understanding that the "introduction" of comprehensive views occurs in the
same sphere where there is debated and found the "justification" for a decision
regarding constitutional essentials and matters of fundamental justice. I will later
focus in on this sentence to attack the assumption underlying it. For now, it suffices
to see that it is not just the public square that has been widened to include
comprehensive views, but also the discourse of government actors who make the
binding decisions affecting the constitutional order and basic freedoms.
To conclude this evolutionary account of Rawls's public reason, it is useful to
touch upon the one concern that originally pushed Rawls toward the inclusive view
and still girds his current wide view. In societies facing fundamental disagreements,
Rawls presumes that citizens on different sides will come to doubt one another's
commitment to political values.6 Three features of the wide view purportedly quell
that doubt. The introduction of comprehensive views to show how they affirm a
political conception will improve mutual trust and confidence; it will show that the
commitment to political values is not merely a modus vivendi.68 It may also
62 IPRR, supra note 7, at 784-86.
63 Id. at 784.
4 id.
65 This seems in accord with Rawls's notion that the Supreme Court is the exemplar of
public reason. See PL, supra note 2, at 231-40.
66 IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
67 PL, supra note 2, at 248-49; IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
68 PL, supra note 2, at 249.
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promote the stability of an overlapping consensus on political values [OC]. 9
Finally, introducing comprehensive doctrines can "open the way" to explain to
others how one's own views support basic political values." As we begin to think
critically about the wide view, it is important to keep in mind this doubt that Rawls
identifies and the three advantages that purportedly come from answering it with
comprehensive views. If it turns out that the wide view does not erase such doubt
or threatens, rather than bolsters, the three features identified above (as I contend),
then we might have reason to reverse trajectory and move back toward an exclusive
view of public reason.
Ill. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROVISO
The best way to consider why the exclusive view of public reason is better
suited for Political Liberalism may be to consider the difficulties and consequences
of the wide view. The proviso allows comprehensive doctrines to be "introduced
in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper
political reasons... [given by a reasonable political conception] are presented that
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said
to support."'" The wide view is flawed because it encourages citizens - speakers
as well as listeners - to treat public reason as an afterthought. There are two
particular issues that demonstrate this flaw: what is meant by "due course" and
whether citizens have to know that they can satisfy the proviso before they offer any
nonpublic reasons.
A. Different Audiences
The "due course" standard poses significant problems for the wide view. I will
focus on one issue that highlights some of my fundamental concerns - would the
proviso require that the public reasons (i.e., the follow-up to the comprehensive
views) be given in the same presentation (e.g., a writing, a speech, a debate)? Or
perhaps in the same forum?"
Before delving into the details of this issue, it is helpful to remember that Rawls
treats public reason as a means for achieving public justification:
69 Id. at lii.
70 IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
71 PL, supra note 2, at li-lii; see also IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
72 Rawls does not work out the particulars himself, though he does think that it ought to
be clear and established how the proviso is to be satisfied. PL, supra note 2, at lii n.26. In
IPRR, Rawls explains that advance rules in this regard need not be made. The details of how
to satisfy the proviso must be worked out in practice. IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
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Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument
addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and
think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could
also reasonably accept. This meets the duty of civility, since in due
course the proviso is satisfied."
Persuasion occurs, then, where both premises and conclusions are presented that
meet the criterion of reciprocity. The following proposition inheres: In a
constitutional debate, citizens who hear only religious doctrinal premises, which
they do not share, will think that the speaker is being unreasonable. The whole
point of Rawls's idea of public reason, after all, is that a speaker's reasonableness
is demonstrated by offering premises that others can reasonably be expected to
accept. The proviso is designed to be sure that such reasons are eventually
introduced. Public reason, thus, is designed to influence other citizens, but it does
so only insofar as speakers offer reasonable reasons to fellow citizens.
With that premise in mind, we can now take up the issue of whether the wide
view requires that the proviso be satisfied in the same public presentation (or at
least in the same particular forum) as the one in which comprehensive doctrines
were introduced. If the proviso does not require that a person offer public reasons
in the same speech or writing, then the citizens who heard the initial comprehensive
views may not ever be exposed to the subsequent justification. There are actually
two dimensions to this problem. First, an initial group of citizens may only receive
reasons grounded in a comprehensive doctrine. Second, the wide view does not
require citizens to explain that they are satisfying the proviso when, in due course,
they offer public reasons; thus, a later group of citizens may not realize that the
public reasons they hear are designed to gird the previously introduced non-public
ones. These risks run if the proviso is satisfied in a different forum as well.
We should not be confused by my use of the words "presentation" and "forum"
here; I use them in a rather conventional sense. A public debate between candidates
or legislative deliberation over a bill are each a political forum in which multiple
presentations, such as speeches, questions, and written commentary, can be made.
Satisfying the proviso within the same presentation would mean that public reasons
come into the same speech or writing as did comprehensive views. Satisfying the
proviso merely within the same particular forum would mean that public reasons
might come in a subsequent presentation within the same debate or decision-making
process. The crucial insight is that the public political culture to which Rawls refers
covers multiple individual forums and presentations within what might be called a
cultural political dialogue.7' We ought not forget that this dialogue is multifaceted
.
7 IPRR, supra note 7, at 786
74 We might read Rawls to require public reasons to come in anywhere in his public
political tripartite forum or public political culture, which would mean subsequent speeches
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and ongoing, especially when thinking about the proviso.
The "due course" standard fails as a means ofjustification because it does not
ensure that comprehensive and political premises are introduced to the same public
audience. The proviso is of little import if the citizens who hear the nonpublic
reasons are never exposed to the public ones. For those listeners, there is nothing
to show that a speaker's allegiance to the political conception is rooted in the
comprehensive reasons being offered." Unfortunately, there are indications in
Rawls's work that he would not support a stricter proviso requiring public reasons
in the same speech or work, or even in the same forum.76 Of the wide view, he
writes:
It is wise, then, for all sides to introduce their comprehensive doctrines,
whether religious or secular, so as to open the way for them to explain
to one another how their views do indeed support those basic political
values."
There are at least two complications with his analysis. First, "open[ing] the
way" sounds like Rawls is content to allow the proviso to come later - after the
debate has begun and after listeners have already been engaged by comprehensive
views. There is no indication that the audience listening in due course will have the
same composition of citizens. Second, he never addresses the serious possibility
that when debating constitutional essentials, a person may "tune out" those fellow
citizens who invoke comprehensive doctrines instead of reasonable political values.
Note that Rawls does not even commit the proviso to being satisfied on the same
day.78 People may not wait patiently for more premises when they cannot accept
the premises they have heard thus far.79
These two features are of critical importance because nothing in the proviso
requires the introduction of comprehensive views to alert fellow citizens that public
reasons will follow. In other words, the wide view contains no mechanism that
distinguishes what we might call permissible non-public reasons (i.e., those that will
or presentations to bolster previous ones.
"' See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784-85.
76 First, Rawls emphasizes that comprehensive doctrines may be introduced at any time.
In addition, when he addresses questions about the specifics of the proviso, he wonders
whether it needs to be satisfied in the same day or on another day. IPRR, supra note 7, at
783-84. Apparently Rawls has not considered my concern that a subsequent justification by
reference to public reasons is of no use if the same citizens are not the ones hearing it.
77 IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
78 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
79 This problem is compounded ifcitizens are not obligated to ascertain whether political
reasons exist to justify their desired conclusion before they introduce comprehensive
doctrines. I take up that issue next. See infra Part III.B.
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be followed with reasons from political values sufficient to support the same
conclusion) from the impermissible ones (i.e., those that will not be buttressed with
proper public reasons). Note that the key point in time is that point at which
religious views are introduced and heard by citizens in the public forum. The
proviso does not alert public audiences as to when they should keep listening and
when they should tune out. In Rawlsian terms, there is no way to know which
comprehensive doctrines are being introduced reasonably (i.e., to be later
accompanied by reasons others could be expected to endorse) and which ones are
being introduced unreasonably (i.e., to be left alone despite the fact that others who
do not share the comprehensive view cannot accept them). Even if we work out the
particulars of the due course standard, therefore, it misses the point: what to do
about the citizens in the public forum who are exposed to comprehensive views and
have no way to know whether the exponent of those is being reasonable - because
she will later introduce public reasons to satisfy the proviso - or whether she is
being unreasonable - because she has only reasons that could not be accepted by
those who do not share the comprehensive view."0
I will return later to this issue because it is even worse than mere uncertainty:
The duty of civility creates a listeners' dilemma that prevents the discouragement
of unreasonable reasons. For now, two points are worth noting. First, the due
course standard treats the public political culture as if it were one stationary set of
ears waiting to take in all the reasons voiced in its presence; but audiences are not
"on call" awaiting the fulfillment of the proviso. A political forum is a dynamic
exchange not only because it involves a back-and-forth deliberation, but also
because participants in a free society enter and leave political debates on their own
accord. "Due course" cannot account for that, so it fails to coordinate
comprehensive views with their public reason reinforcements. A second point is
one to which I shall return: When comprehensive views are introduced to support
a particular position, audiences have no way to know whether public reasons to
support such a view exist or - if they do - when or if the speaker ever plans to
offer them. The due course standard is a shell game of sorts that moves our
attention to the public reasons to come and allows us to miss the problem of the
non-public reasons floating about on their own. Those engaged in public debates
do not have that luxury - they are left grappling with comprehensive doctrinal
reasons already presented. And there is no way to tell whether such reasons can or
will magically become reasonable by appeals to political values in due course.
" Because Rawls considers the ideal fulfilled whenever citizens abide by public reason,
he must recognize that sometimes citizens will not behave ideally. Unfortunately, he never
addresses this problem or the relation between those who adhere to public reason and those
who blatantly disregard it. This is part of a larger issue that he neglects: how to figure out
what reasons count as justificatory (as opposed to superfluous) in a sea of reasoned
deliberation. I will try to take up this problem in Part IV.
[Vol. 10:3
PUBLIC REASON RESUSCITATED
B. Strategic Conundrum
I assume that, to satisfy the wide view, citizens would have to know that they
could meet the proviso before they offer any non-public reasons. This assumption
seems consistent with Rawls's prediction that doctrines would accept the proviso
and then come into a political debate."' Presumably, if a citizen desired a
conclusion that could not be justified by public reasons, there would exist a moral
duty not to introduce comprehensive views in a constitutional debate. 2 It is worth
mentioning here that the exclusive view of public reason, which I advocate, asks
little more from citizens than the wide view. Because one's public reasons have
already been determined under the wide view anyway, the exclusive view merely
asks citizens to offer only those views. Put another way, the criterion of reciprocity
distinguishes the public reasons from the unreasonable ones, and the wide view
requires that the distinction be made in advance. The only difference in my
exclusive view is that reasons failing the reciprocity test (e.g., other free and equal
citizens will not reasonably be expected to endorse them) would then be left out of
public political discourse.
But even a skeptic of the exclusive view could find Rawlsian grounds for
concluding that the wide view is unnecessary. If citizens know in advance that there
are public reasons to support their desired conclusion, why would they not simply
offer those reasons? There is a much better chance of being persuasive since, by
definition, a public reason is one reasonably expected to be endorsed by others. 3
Public reasons draw on shared political values and common-sense methods of
inquiry. They are not based upon comprehensive doctrines that listeners will not
"I "When these doctrines accept the proviso and only then come into political debate, the
commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested." IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
Notice two implicit assumptions that are not supported by the wide view. First, this notion
of public manifestation and proviso acceptance makes it sound as though there is some
articulated embrace of the proviso that occurs ex ante in the political forum. Nothing of the
kind occurs in Rawlsian public reason, however; any acceptance of the proviso is articulated
only by offering public reasons to support comprehensive views introduced into the public
political debate. The second, and related, assumption is that entering the debate amounts to
a manifested commitment to democracy. But of course Rawls has structured the wide view
so that entering the debate can begin by the introduction of comprehensive views first. As
noted in the previous section, this may look as much like unreasonable behavior as
committed public reasoning, because the reasons drawing on political values come later in
due course. Thus, entering the debate itself really indicates nothing as far as public reason
goes. If ever, the commitment to democracy would be shown after the satisfaction of the
proviso, which comes after a doctrine enters public discourse and after nonpublic reasons
have been given.
82 Note that the duty to follow the dictates of public reason is not a legal one. It is only
a moral duty. IPRR, supra note 7, at 769.
83 PL, supra note 2, at 226.
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share. Thus, the wide view has strange incentives that seem counterintuitive for
persuasion. A citizen realizes that there are reasons others may accept, but then,
with that realization, the citizen offers reasons that cannot be accepted by others
because they depend on a comprehensive view. If one's aim is truly to persuade and
to forge a majority or consensus, it makes sense to center one's argument around
shared premises.
Later in this Article, I will suggest what I think are the real motives for
introducing comprehensive views, and these are all corrosive ofpublicjustification.
For now, though, the point is simply this: Given the need to be certain that there are
public reasons to support a conclusion before one introduces a comprehensive view,
it is strategically unnecessary and downright risky to offer reasons that others
cannot be expected to endorse. On the one hand, these reasons could dilute the
message of one's public reasons drawn on political values. On the other, assertions
based on religion are unreasonable insofar as they depend upon beliefs that some
listeners do not share; audiences may be offended by unreasonable reasons and
either: (a) discount the accompanying public reasons; or (b) tune out the moment
speakers engage in reasoning that draws upon controversial comprehensive
doctrinal premises. In sum, if the logic of Rawls's notion of reasonableness and the
reciprocity criterion makes sense, then the introduction of non-public reasons
should be a strategic persuasive error.
Because Rawls is not explicit that citizens must know ex ante that they will be
capable of satisfying the proviso expost, I should say a quick word on the possible
interpretation that citizens would (or should) not have to realize or to pinpoint
public reasons justifying a conclusion before offering a comprehensive view in a
constitutional debate. This would present a different, yet more damaging, flaw for
the wide view. First, there would be a significant risk that some comprehensive
views would be introduced that ultimately could not be justifiable in terms of public
reasons - that is, comprehensive views would enter constitutional debates without
assurance that the proviso can be satisfied. Even if the doctrines ultimately were
justifiable, however, it would be hard to say that the wide view so conceived best
supports the ideal of public reason. Citizens would then be supporting conclusions
in a constitutional debate without first ascertaining whether reasonable premises
exist. Public reason would become a fortuity rather than a constraint, so I contend
that we should read Rawls's wide view as requiring identification of public reasons
in advance, even though their articulation need only come in due course.
But even if citizens must come up with political reasons before they introduce
comprehensive doctrines, the wide view remains problematic. If citizens formulate
public reasons first, why would they offer reasons based upon unshared truths? The
criterion of reciprocity takes on a strange role in the wide view. It does not separate
permissible public reasons from those we should keep to ourselves or keep within
our background cultural discussions. Instead, it distinguishes reasonable from
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unreasonable reasons, although citizens are allowed to offer those very reasons that
they themselves understand to be unreasonable to others. The wide view actually
encourages citizens to put forward reasons in public debate that are not drawn on
any common shared political values and that other citizens will consider
unacceptable.
C. Further Doubt
Now I will question whether the proviso Rawls constructs lives up to his hopes
for the wide view. One of the main concerns driving Rawls toward the inclusive,
and then wide, views of public reason is that citizens with different comprehensive
doctrines in a debate may come to doubt one another's allegiance to fundamental
political values.' "One way this doubt might be put to rest," he argues, "is for
leaders of the opposing groups to present in the public forum how their
comprehensive doctrines do indeed affirm those values." ' Rawls presumes that
knowledge of others' allegiance strengthens public confidence and mutual trust.8 6
At first blush, the existence of this doubt seems to contradict the defining traits
of a well-ordered society: "[E]veryone accepts [and knows that everyone else
accepts] and publicly endorses, the very same principles ofjustice."87 Remember
that the lingering doubt rationale for the wide view does not simply refer to
societies that are not well-ordered; Rawls dropped the inclusive view's condition
that comprehensive views could only be introduced in those situations of unjust
conditions. As for specific doubt about a religious doctrine's commitment to
democratic values, Political Liberalism takes that as a given so long as its adherents
behave reasonably, "it being understood by everyone that of course the plurality of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens is thought by them to provide
further and often transcendent backing for those values."'  Utilizing only
reasonable reasons would seem to be a way of demonstrating the reasonableness of
one's view. Despite the initial mutual recognition that others share a political
conception of justice, Rawls insists that suspicion and doubt will creep in when
faced with "highly contested" issues.89
84 PL, supra note 2, at 248; IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
85 PL, supra note 2, at 249; IPRR, supra note 7, at 785. Note that this justification for
the wide view of public reason is not limited to leaders. It applies to citizens as well: "The
proviso of citizens' justifying their conclusions in due course by public reasons secures what
is needed. It has the further advantage of showing to other citizens the roots in our
comprehensive doctrines of our allegiance to the political conception, which strengthens
stability... ." PL, supra note 2, at Iii.
86 PL, supra note 2, at lii.
87 Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 243.
89 IPRR, supra note 7, at 785; see also PL, supra note 2, at 248 (noting that, in a nearly
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What is especially strange is the underlying tension in his account of the
proviso as a response to that doubt. To see the contradiction upon which the wide
view is premised, consider that Rawls frames the entire public reason project as an
attribute of democracy, and he argues that understanding what it means to be a
citizen includes understanding how to follow public reason.' ° "Citizens realize that
they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis
of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines."' Thus, they propose terms of fair
cooperation based on a reasonable political conception of justice "provided that
other citizens also accept those terms."'92 The public reason component of those fair
terms asks citizens to view themselves as legislators and to offer reasons that others
can accept.93 "The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics," he poignantly
stresses, "is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with
democratic citizenship.' 94
The inescapable lesson is that citizens demonstrate their commitment by
limiting their own reasons and resorting to political values that others can be
expected to endorse. Resisting the urge to incorporate one's version of the whole
truth is a mark of virtue and a sign of willingness to cooperate. Besides, Rawlsian
citizens see from the outset that mutual understanding based on comprehensive
views rather than shared political values is nearly impossible. But if all this is right,
then it makes no sense for Rawls to argue simultaneously that limiting ourselves to
public reasons is the source of skepticism and doubt. What he portrays in one
breath as the way we show other citizens that we embrace the cooperative
enterprise, he later characterizes as the very basis for their doubt about that same
commitment! And Rawls then prescribes for that doubt the very opposite of shared
political values - the introduction of comprehensive views that offer (if only a
glimpse) our vision of the whole truth.95
But of all the people whose commitment to democracy we might question, why
would it be the citizens who faithfully advance public reasons alone? It seems
much more likely that citizens would be suspicious of those who seek to inject
religious views into constitutional debates. In my view, such doubt is itself the
defect to be cured. To discount public reasons based on some ethereal doubt is
itself unreasonable. In other words, it is not fair to expect citizens to do more than
behave reasonably, which they do by offering reasons others could be expected to
endorse. When citizens and government officials are complying with the dictates
well-ordered society, a serious dispute over the proper application of a principle of justice
can produce the same doubt).
90 IPRR, supra note 7, at 765; PL, supra note 2, at 218.
"' IPRR, supra note 7, at 766.
92 Id. at 770.
9' Id. at 770-71.
9" Id. at 767. See also id. at 771; PL, supra note 2, at 218.
15 PL, supra note 2, at 249; IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
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of public reason and we still find ourselves doubting their commitment to
democratic reciprocity, we should begin to consider the possibility that it is our own
prejudice that produces doubt. It might be our own distaste for the opponents'
comprehensive views or enthusiastic loyalty to our own that prompts us to doubt
their allegiance to constitutionalism. Either way, it is unreasonable to question
citizens' loyalty to democratic equality and liberty when they endeavor to
demonstrate that very commitment by reliance on political conceptions of justice
rather than their own comprehensive doctrine."
It is no answer for Rawls to say, as he might, that his worries about doubt were
only for "highly contested political issue[s]," " "serious dispute[s] ... in applying
... principles ofjustice,"'9 or "profound division about constitutional essentials." '99
Such are the questions to which public reason applies. After all, Rawls chose not
to cover ordinary political decisions within his ideal; " public reason is for the big
questions. So while he sees the willingness to forego the whole truth as both (a)
desirable for making decisions over constitutional essentials and fundamental
liberties and (b) the mark of "civic friendship,"'' he immediately succumbs to the
notion that that same willingness also breeds suspicion and doubt.0 2 Moreover, that
doubt is enough to change trajectories and begin explaining one's comprehensive
view - the very dialogue we sought to remove from fundamental political
deliberation.
One final note on this point: It is hard to imagine when questions over
constitutional essentials and fundamental justice will ever be anything but contested
matters of dispute and division. While we may share an overlapping political value
set, disagreement is to be expected. And if the subject matter of a disagreement is
fundamental, ipsofacto the division will run deep; stakes and values will be at their
highest ebb. And so the moment Rawls capitulated his ideal to the fear that citizens
might doubt one another's commitment to democracy, °3 it was inevitable that his
"inclusive" allowance for comprehensive views would come to swallow the rule.
96 We might also worry about the implications of Rawls's use of doubt as a reason for
preferring the wide view. If he is correct that doubt will persist, the solution for which is an
explanation of comprehensive views, then there may be pressure to utilize the wide view.
In other words, citizens might feel compelled to invoke their doctrine and then satisfy the
proviso rather than relying on public reasons only. While it is certainly desirable to have
citizens satisfy the proviso if they decide to introduce comprehensive views, we should be
hesitant to embrace a proviso that actually encourages reliance on comprehensive views.
97 IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
98 PL, supra note 2, at 248.
Id. at 249.
'00 See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
o' IPRR, supra note 7, at 771.
102 id.
"03 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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This is a far cry from the original impulse beckoning people to aspire to an ideal
citizenship with public reason that "describes what is possible and can be, yet may
never be, though no less fundamental for that."'"
D. Sufficiency as Insufficient
Moving past my disappointment that Rawls succumbed to the specter of doubt,
we can now consider the possibility that he was right. Thus, I will now take as a
given that citizens may come to doubt one another's allegiance to shared political
values. The problem here is not necessarily with Rawls's presumption: Knowing
that fellow citizens are committed to public reason may indeed inspire a person to
make such a commitment herself, and may also reassure her that the public reasons
give by her opponents are genuine. I just do not see how the wide view of public
reason accomplishes as much as Rawls suggests. In the wide view, religious
reasons may be introduced at any time and in any fashion."5 To satisfy the proviso,
all a citizen need do is (1) give a non-public reason and (2) in due course give a
public reason. The two sets of reasons must only justify the same conclusion.'0 6
Rawls never suggests that the proviso's moral duty to offer a public reason
includes the duty to explain how one's comprehensive doctrine affirms the political
conception.'0 7 In other words, the wide view of public reason allows particular non-
public reasons to come into the constitutional debate assuming that subsequent
public reasons (sufficient to justify the same conclusion) will come in also. The
proviso does nothing to demonstrate the connection between comprehensive
doctrine and public political conception.
Take an abortion debate as an example. A Catholic argues that the right to an
abortion ought not be constitutionally protected. In the debate, the Catholic argues
from her comprehensive view that life begins at conception, that interference with
reproduction is against God's law, and that the soul inheres at the moment of
conception. These are obviously nonpublic reasons. The wide view, as Rawls
presently conceives of it, asks only that the Catholic citizen in due course argue
'0 PL, supra note 2, at 213.
IS d. at li; IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
'o See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
0 An interesting question is why it would have to be one's own doctrine at all.
Presumably, Rawls's affinity for sincerity would make him hesitant about a rule that allowed
anyone to give non-public reasons regardless of whether those reasons come from the
doctrine one really cares about. We can imagine two scenarios where someone might want
to convey a doctrine she does not share, one good and one not so good. First, legislators
might want to convey constituents' comprehensive views even though the particular
representative does not share the view. Second, citizens might want to capitalize on what
they believe is a doctrine's persuasive force, so they might incorporate views from doctrines
to which they do not subscribe in toto.
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something like: abortion was not a right protected historically in the United States;
and is not implicit in the modem concept of ordered liberty. The right to life is
inalienable, and government has a compelling interest in preserving lives incapable
of asserting their own rights.
The proviso actually does little to demonstrate the Catholic doctrine's
commitment to political values; it makes those values seem like the citizen's post
hoc justifications. Now, of course, some citizens might choose to make more
elaborate connections between Catholicism and political justice, but the proviso
certainly does not require that. Sufficiency of subsequent public reasons is all that
Rawls requires - those reasons must adequately support the point pressed earlier
with comprehensive views.'
The proviso could be refashioned to do more, of course. For example, the wide
view could ask a citizen who offers reasons from his comprehensive doctrine to
later say why or how his comprehensive view affirms a political conception. This
sort of proviso would actually quell the doubt about which Rawls worries, because
it would illustrate either where, why, or how a doctrine joins the overlapping
consensus. Such a revised proviso might ask the Catholic to say: "Catholicism is
committed to the free exercise and non-establishment of religion in this country.
And so here are public reasons that support my claims against abortion based on
Catholic teaching." Rather than a recitation ofjust any political reasons, this shows
at least one point where the comprehensive doctrine falls within the overlapping
consensus. Why might this be a better proviso than Rawls's? The focus is on the
speaker's comprehensive view. If nothing else, it articulates a religious doctrine's
commitment to certain political values instead ofjust a citizen's recitation of those
values. That commitment is what Rawls wanted to highlight with his wide view.
I ultimately conclude, however, that a wide view of public reason (even with a
revised proviso) is inferior to an exclusive view as a means of democratic
deliberative justification and as a component of Rawlsian political liberalism.
Apart from the fact that the proviso could, but really does not, show how
comprehensive doctrines affirm political conceptions of justice, its sufficiency
standard also poses a problem for deliberation.
E. Sufficiency as Overwhelming
While Rawls wanted to leave the details of the proviso to be worked out in
practice, 0 9 we can at least focus in on the one criterion for public reasons that it
requires. Having considered the inability of the proviso to alert citizens as to when
and how a correlative set of comprehensive views and public reasons will be
presented, the sufficiency standard itself need be addressed. Recall that religious
" IPRR, supra note 7, at 7"4; PL, supra note 2, at lii.
109 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
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reasons may be introduced "at any time" provided that political reasons are
presented in due course "that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive
doctrines introduced are said to support."" 0 Two related conclusions about the
wide view follow from this rule. First, public reasons need only be sufficient to
support one's position in a constitutional or basic justice debate; there is no relation
between the volume or content of public reasons and of comprehensive views.
Second, comprehensive doctrine exhortations may dominate one's political
discourse on any given issue as long as one offers up a sufficient public reason
foundation supportive of one's position.
The first point is rather basic, but can be easily overlooked when fixating on the
degree to which comprehensive views may be introduced. Rawls's proviso ensures
that adequate public reasons ground one's public positions. This "sufficiency"
standard reflects Rawls's notion that deliberative justification for law depends on
the public reasons advanced for it and is unchanged by additional comprehensive
views should they tag along."' I will challenge that (mis)understanding in Part
IV. "2 For now, the first salient trait of the proviso lies in its different standards for
comprehensive views and public reasons. The former have no bounds - religious
reasons may be included within public political argument at any time and in any
fashion one sees fit."' The latter need only be sufficient to support one's
conclusion. The second salient trait is that there is no relation between the two
standards.
Notice that the sufficiency standard proves my point in the previous section that
satisfaction of the proviso will not necessarily demonstrate (a) any explicit personal
commitment to political ideals beyond that which would come by using public
reasons alone and (b) any specific doctrinal affirmation of political values.' '
Again, the proviso adds reasons that complement what one has said before from
one's comprehensive view, but it does not necessarily explain any further
commitments. The reason why the proviso does less than Rawls suggests can be
found in the sufficiency standard: It contains no guidance as to the relationship
between comprehensive and public reasons aside from their mutual conclusion.
10 Id. at 783-84. This definition is slightly different from the explanation of proviso in
the paperback edition, where public reasons must be "sufficient to support whatever the
comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support." PL, supra note 2, at lii. The only
difference in the later formation is the use of the phrase "said to," which I take to mean that
comprehensive views ought to be anchored somehow to the subject matter of a debate over
constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice. That is, there would not be free form
comprehensive views devoid of any stated linkage to some question at play in the public
political culture.
"'. See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
1t2 See infra Part IV.
"' I take up the temporal issue next and the stylistic issue in Parts IV and V-B.
"" See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
740 [Vol. 10:3
PUBLIC REASON RESUSCITATED
By ensuring a fit between public reasons and one's position, but omitting any
linkage between those public reasons and comprehensive views, the proviso allows
for deliberation dominated by reasons that fail the reciprocity criterion. Citizens
essentially may offer a deluge of comprehensive views without constraint on any
given constitutional question, so long as their ultimate answer can be supported by
public reason. That means speeches satisfying the proviso may be ninety percent
religious if in fact ten percent is enough to articulate a sufficient public reason for
one's position. In fact, once one identifies public reasons adequate to support an
argument, comprehensive views can go on ad infinitum. Public reason is a
disclaimer of sorts that can be added on to any unreasonable position taken by a
reasonable doctrine. Public reason compliance requires no parity of time, effort,
rhetoric, or attention between comprehensive views and the political values that
buttress their conclusion.
For Rawls, this might be acceptable, because he allows practical incentives to
do the work of policing the style and content of comprehensive views. As will
become clear in Part V-B," 5 he may not have considered a claim, such as mine, that
references to comprehensive doctrines in political debates may not be persuasive,
given the controversial premises on which they are based. For now, we should
merely recognize the possibility that, if one wanted to emphasize one's doctrine but
remain compliant with public reason, there is no disincentive to making one's
public reasons sufficient to support a conclusion but letting comprehensive views
pervade and dominate one's contribution to public political debate. Satisfaction of
the proviso is license to pontificate at will. I find that possibility disturbing.
As a way out of this dilemma, we should probably rethink the reciprocity
criterion. As it stands, every citizen must have some test by which to decide "what
principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may
reasonably be expected to endorse along with us."' 6 While this suffices to devise
proper political reasons, it fails to account for the possibility that what we articulate
along with those political values may in fact be determinative of others' reaction
and estimation. Two possibilities are worth considering. First, the style by which
we articulate arguments may in fact be supportive or corrosive of others' ability to
endorse our reasons. In other words, unreasonable statements accompanying even
proper public reasons might inhibit fellow citizens' ability to endorse the public
reasons. Just as Rawls thinks that the justification of law is unchanged by
additional comprehensive views in deliberation," 7 he probably thinks the
reciprocity determination of what reasons draw on political values is unchanged by
the content of accompanying statements. I find that hard to believe, and I will press
the issue more as a persuasive defect of the wide view. Second, the relative weight
". See infra Part V.B.
16 PL, supra note 2, at 226.
"7 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
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or numerosity of arguments may bear on their reasonableness. This is different
from the stylistic problem, whereby political reasons appear unreasonable because
of the tenor of what is said in the context of religious views. The numerosity
problem exists where political values as well as comprehensive views are presented
with a respectful style and substance, but the relative attention given to religion is
so pronounced that the overall contribution to dialogue is patently inaccessible by
those who do not subscribe to the doctrine.
For both problems, what others find reasonable may be determined by more
than the sufficiency of the political values portion of a speech or presentation.
Instead, the total effect of what is said in a debate may determine the willingness of
citizens to endorse reasons. There is not much in Rawls's work to demand that that
should not be the case, especially because he sees the justification of law as bound
up in citizens' assessment that reasonable political values are responsible for the
constitutional order." 8 And the duty of civility should probably extend to all of
one's contributions in public debates. After all, the duty to listen presumably
includes comprehensive views as well as public reasons. If that is the case, and
citizens know it, why should they not formulate their own reciprocity criteria on the
proposition that the reasonableness of their position rests in all that they put
forward? Once such considerations enter the reciprocity criteria, the absence of any
link between the type or amount of comprehensive views and their public reason
counterparts beckons for solution.
Because I see the total content of deliberation as comprising the justification for
resulting decisions, I cannot subscribe to the proviso; public reasons sufficient to
support one position should not enable citizens to infuse debates with religious
views without limitation or mitigation. Defenders of a proviso need to give some
assurance of parity, or else public debates may become inflated with nonpublic
reasons. Before moving to related persuasive problems for a wide view in a
deliberative democracy, I offer one more thought on the proviso - why does Rawls
not think about chronology?
F. Proviso Ex Ante
A final problem with the wide view is the implicit understanding that the
satisfaction of the proviso will occur after comprehensive views have been
introduced. Rawls leaves the "when?" question open, but he considers only how
long after the introduction of comprehensive views the public reasons will come."9
To borrow from Merriam-Webster, "in due course" means "after [a] natural passage
of time."' 20 We can safely assume, therefore, that the wide view is designed so that
18 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 766.
"9 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 784; PL, supra note 2 at lii, n.26.
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public reasons sufficient to support conclusions urged by reference to
comprehensive views will be introduced after their non-public counterparts.
Never does Rawls consider that the comprehensive views might instead come
in due course. That is, all descriptions of the proviso read out the possibility that
it should be satisfied ex ante. I will call this the up front proviso. Note that its
burden on citizens is really no greater. We have already established that citizens
should know that they can satisfy the proviso before bringing in comprehensive
views. Not only is that the fairer reading of the wide view, but it also resonates with
Rawls's demand that the proviso must be satisfied in good faith.' The criterion
of reciprocity needs to determine which reasons others can or cannot be expected
to endorse. The up front proviso merely flips the order in which reasons are
introduced so that the public ones come first.
I do not mean to defend the up front proviso so much as to consider why it
might be more desirable and to point out that no one seems to have contemplated
it. It would at least solve the problem of distinguishing reasonable from
unreasonable discourse. Citizens would know from the start whether a speaker
would satisfy the proviso by offering public reasons; they would no longer have to
wait through comprehensive views, unsure whether sufficient public reasons were
on the way. This would enable appropriate "tune-outs," whereby citizens would
stop engaging peers who refused to live up to the ideal of public reason. By the
time the ordinary proviso is not satisfied, it is too late - a citizen has already
fulfilled the duty to listen to the comprehensive views.
Of course, the up front proviso does little or nothing about two other problems
already noted. Merely flipping the order does not contain an additional alert so that
citizens would know that additional reasons drawn from comprehensive views were
on the due course horizon. Moreover, there still exists the problem of a dynamic,
fluid public audience within the political culture. There still is no guarantee that the
same people will be exposed to religious views and their correlative public reasons.
The lesson here is simply that Rawls did not think enough about chronology and
citizens' perspectives while listening to public debates. If one wanted to
demonstrate that one's own views were reasonable, it would seem logical to start
with shared political premises rather than controversial ones drawn from unshared
truths. Moreover, the people to whom such persuasive appeals are directed would
at least know that the proviso had been satisfied, so that the following
comprehensive views were not being introduced unreasonably. Despite the still-
present duration uncertainty for due course, the up front proviso at least allows
citizens to be sure that the proviso is satisfied before their duty to listen exposes
them to unreasonable arguments. I assume here that the duty of civility to listen
subsides at the point where another person starts speaking unreasonably.
UNABRIDGED 522 (1986).
... IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
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A rigid reading of Rawls's due course proviso would hold that he insists upon
public reasons coming after comprehensive views, the idea being that he chose the
order purposefully and not because he never thought of calling for public reasons
up front. After all, he does envision the introduction of comprehensive views as
opening the way for subsequent discussion of political values.'22 I will not pursue
that interpretation, but if it is right, then the following holds: a person who offers
public reasons sufficient to support a conclusion to which he thereafter offers
religious views would still need to offer public reasons again. I am not sure if
Rawls would find some magic in having the public reasons come later, but it is
notable that he consistently describes that order as he defends the wide view.
IV. PERSUASIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE WIDE VIEW
The primary rationale for an exclusive view of public reason comes from the
recognition that justification of constitutional law in a democracy stems from all the
reasons put forward in deliberation and attributed to a decision. In this section,
therefore, my overarching goal is to contest a statement found in Rawls's most
recent exposition on public reason: "It is important also to observe that the
introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doctrines, provided
the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content ofjustifcation in public
reason itself."'23
This reflects a misconception about deliberative democracy. Essentially, Rawls
assumes that, as long as there are public reasons sufficient to support a conclusion,
then the nature of the justification itself is not changed regardless of what additional
premises are introduced. 4 In terms of pure logic, he may be right.'25 Yet I find this
assumption both troubling for public debate and inconsistent with other aspects his
work.
A. Unfiltered Deliberation
To set up the issue, it may be best to use an example. Imagine a constitutional
debate over whether homosexuals have a fundamental right to marry same-sex
122 See IPRR, supra note 7, at 785.
"2 Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
124 id.
,25 Consider the theorem: "Only if public reason A, then constitutional result X." Citizen
says A but also says B, C, and D. Decision X follows; B, C, and D are superfluous,
therefore, because A was necessary and sufficient. Most public reasons on constitutional
essentials will not be "only ifs," though. So the more likely theorem would be "if public
reason A, then constitutional result X." Citizen says A, B, C, and D. Again, decision X
follows; A is sufficient, though not necessary if other premises can result in X. Query
whether the resulting decision X is suggestive that B, C or D are contributory reasons for X.
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partners. A government official explains that her Christian faith incorporates
biblical proscriptions of homosexual conduct; thus, she is reluctant to recognize any
right to a government imprimatur on same-sex sexual relationships. A citizen puts
his opposition more crisply, noting that by facilitating homosexual conduct and
protecting it through marriage, America will suffer the same fate as Sodom, the city
purportedly destroyed by God's wrath for its citizens' illicit conduct.'26
Accordingly, he holds up placards reading "God hates fags" outside legislative
debates and court proceedings where same-sex unions are considered.2 7 Both the
official and the citizen later explain that: (1) marriage is constitutionally protected
because of its procreative potential, an absent feature in a same-sex union; (2)
Western civilization traditionally has not afforded the same rights to same-sex
couples that it has to opposite-sex couples; (3) one man-one woman marriage rights
are open to homosexuals the same as everyone else, so they are not treated
unequally; and (4) there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, 28 so no corresponding marriage right should be recognized to insulate such
conduct. Now both the official and the citizen have satisfied the wide view. The
subsequent reasons drawing on political values support a conclusion that same-sex
marriages are not constitutionally compelled.
At the outset, it is important to realize that "God hates fags" is not beyond the
confines of what is allowed by the wide view. First, there are no limitations in the
wide view on how such religious doctrines are expressed.'29 Rawls leaves that to
the discretion of the speaker. Second, although Rawls limits the wide view to
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, he does not prevent those doctrines from
introducing unreasonable comments. 3 ' He admits that even reasonable doctrines
may sometimes take unreasonable positions, though it appears that any conclusion
is rendered reasonable as long as the proviso can be met for it.'
126 See Genesis 13:13, 19:1-29.
.27 This example is not facetious. Fred Phelps, Sr., and the Westboro Baptist Church of
Topeka, Kansas, have launched an anti-homosexual crusade ranging from debates over
school curricula to domestic partnership benefits. God Hates Fags, at http://www.
godhatesfags.com/main/aboutwbc.html (last visited 2/20/2002). Though Phelps and his
followers usually make public demonstrations at churches, schools, and funerals of AIDS
patients, the group also pickets government bodies when homosexual-related topics are
under consideration. The organization's website at http://www.godhatesfags.com provides
a thorough, rather frightening, account of its views.
'2 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129 "However, there are no restrictions or requirements on how religious or secular
doctrines are themselves to be expressed; these doctrines need not, for example, be by some
standards logically correct, or open to rational appraisal, or evidentially supportable." IPRR,
supra note 7, at 784.
130 Id. at 798, n.80.
' Id, "Of course, a comprehensive doctrine can be unreasonable on one or several issues
without being simply unreasonable." Id.
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Finally, this particular expression, though crude, does support a legal
conclusion that is defensible by reasonable political values. ' For example, many
fundamentalist religious doctrines hold that homosexual sex is a sin, yet many of
these are reasonable ones that share in the overlapping consensus. Fundamentalists
may not advocate stripping homosexuals of basic liberties or denying them an
adequate share of primary goods; instead, these doctrines could merely oppose
public affirmation or support for homosexual physical relations, which gay marriage
would provide. Moreover, claims like "God hates fags," though crude and
potentially hurtful, do not treat homosexuals as less free or less equal when: (a)
they claim religious truths that do not question political freedom and equality; and
(b) the underlying position on same-sex marriage is supported by public reasons.
Thus, our hypothetical official abides by the idea of public reason, and our
citizen fulfills the ideal of public reason; both offer public reasons sufficient to
support the conclusion that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The
fact that one religious citizen opposes gay marriage by quoting the Leviticus
passage calling homosexual conduct an "abomination,"' 33 and another adds
rhetorical punch with "God hates fags," does not matter for the wide view - both
are permissible manifestations of religious doctrines if supported by sufficient
public reasons.
Now here is the odd part. Rawls asserts that the nature and content of the
justification for a decision rejecting a constitutional right for persons of the same
sex to marry are not altered by the inclusion of Christian doctrine, Biblical
references, and claims about God's will. The claim is counterintuitive. First, the
nature of the justification is altered because it now includes reasons beyond the
realm of political values. Appeals to God's law have a different "nature" than
appeals to reasonable political values because only the latter are situated within the
very consensus that gives legitimacy to constitutional decisions in the first place.
The content ofjustification is changed as well. Although there are sufficient public
reasons offered in the wide view, they do not erase the existence of religious
reasons used to oppose same-sex marriage.
Apparently Rawls presumes that, as long as a conclusion is supported by public
reasons, then the comprehensive views do not interfere with that justification. In
other words, the wide view ensures that constitutional decisions are supported by
public reasons; beyond that, it does not matter that nonpublic reasons are also
"' I assume that the subsequent reasons offered in the example are reasonable and
therefore public.
.'3 "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination. Neither shalt
thou lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand before a
beast to lie down thereto: it is confusion." Leviticus 18:22-23. "If a man also lie with
mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall
surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them." Leviticus 20:13.
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introduced. The problem is that deliberative democracy has no apparatus to filter
reasons that are unnecessary to a particular conclusion. Instead, reasons are simply
put forward so that other citizens may evaluate them. There is no basis to think that
citizens will not consider all the reasons given in a constitutional debate (i.e., the
religious beliefs and political values) as justifying a conclusion. And here is the
rub: Public justification in a democracy depends solely on what is said and done
in the course of deliberation. Unless citizens will not perceive the comprehensive
doctrines they hear as part of the public reason for a decision, Rawls should not
simply shed those doctrines just because underneath there was - all along - an
adequate justification from the political values alone.
In a deliberative democracy, moreover, the justification given for any
constitutional essential is not merely the rational connection between premises and
conclusion. Legitimacy depends not only upon a rational connection between
premises and conclusions, but also upon some level of consensus on those premises.
Even the Supreme Court (Rawls's exemplar of public reason) must give reasons that
not only justify a result in the case at hand, but also carry enough weight themselves
to be sustained in future decisions. Once such premises no longer curry favor with
a majority of the Court, the previous conclusion may be overruled. The same is
generally true of constitutional decisions and legislation: Once the premises
underlying the status quo are considered unreasonable, we can expect a move
toward revision.
To sum up, legitimacy in a constitutional democracy stems not only from the
validity of a conclusion (i.e., that it follows logically from the premises), but also
from the reasonableness of its premises (i.e., that they can be accepted even if not
affirmed as being true). Because democracy is deliberative and because there is
freedom of speech, there is really no advance mechanism by which reasons are
labeled public or non-public. Instead, citizens hear all the reasons. It is not enough
for Rawls simply to declare that the justification in a public debate is unchanged by
the presence of comprehensive doctrines - he would have explain why citizens and
government officials to whom reasons are presented think the justification is the
same with or without the comprehensive views. In other words, if the infusion of
religious rhetoric changes the nature and bases upon which listeners justify a
conclusion, then the justification itself is different.
B. Amalgamated Reasons
Rawls's work shows why the inclusion of comprehensive doctrines does have
the ability to alter the nature of public justification. He tries to enable public
discussion by limiting reasoning to rest on the sort of "truths" that are accepted or
available to citizens generally.'34 Thus, it is surprising that Rawls would take the
" PL, supra note 2, at 225.
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line that justification is adequate if a speaker includes some public reasons - even
though other citizens are also exposed to comprehensive views that they cannot be
expected to endorse. The very test of reasonableness is, in fact, the way arguments
are perceived by others.'35 That is why Rawls refers to a criterion of reciprocity.
Here we can identify three potential limitations in citizens' capacity that belie
Rawls's presumption that justification does not change with the addition of
comprehensive doctrinal premises - distinction, severability, and justificatory
logic. First, that a citizen using his criterion of reciprocity can figure out which of
his arguments are reasonable and which of them depend on comprehensive views
does not ensure that listeners in the public political forum will be able to distinguish
between the two. Actually, two phenomena are at work: the inability of speakers
to articulate the distinction and the inability of listeners to apprehend it. Rawls
glosses over this problem by portraying the proviso as subsequent: distinctions
seem likely and readily apparent in the abstract. It is doubtful that government
officials and citizens will always present public reasons separately, however. Much
more likely is a mix of political values and comprehensive views within one
presentation.'3 6 And so there is even a third phenomenon worth identifying: the
potential disparity between the distinction a speaker articulates between his public
and his comprehensive doctrinal reasons and the distinction as listeners perceive it.
In other words, both speaker and listener are trying to distinguish public reason
from comprehensive views; they are just drawing a different line between the two.
While this problem might not seem likely when the comprehensive views are
somehow religious or blatantly non-public, it might be difficult to distinguish
secular comprehensive philosophies (such as comprehensive liberalism or
utilitarianism) from political values. In sum, the critique here is not that citizens
completely lack the capacity to distinguish public reasons from comprehensive
doctrines; instead, the problem is that they might not successfully articulate the
distinction when speaking or perceive the distinction when listening. And it would
seem vital to public reason that such distinctions not merely exist but that they be
recognizable.
Beyond the initial problem of whether reasons can be properly distinguished
when introduced into public debates, there is still a problem of severability. That
is, assuming now that citizens do realize which reasons are not drawn on political
values, what can they do with them? Here I am pressing on Rawls's claim that the
"' "Public reason further asks of us that the balance of those values we hold to be
reasonable in a particular case is a balance we sincerely think can be seen to be reasonable
by others." Id. at 253.
136 Notice that this problem is the opposite of the one that inheres when citizens do
separate their public reasons from their introduction of comprehensive views. In that case,
the dilemma is how to figure out when and if the public reasons will follow. Here, I identify
the problem when everything is given in one lump contribution to the political debate.
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nature of justification is not changed by the addition of comprehensive views.
Perhaps the best way to frame my objection is to use his own example - rules of
evidence.
The claim that public reason is somewhat akin to evidentiary rules enables
Rawls to explain that sometimes we prefer decisions reached without appeals to the
"whole truth.""' I agree with him that some evidence is kept out in order to secure
rights and duties as well as to promote ideals.' The problem is that Rawls fails to
grasp the underlying premise behind rules of evidence: we assume that all evidence
that comes in will likely affect the outcome, so we keep some things out. That
simple premise goes far in understanding the flaw in the wide view.
The exclusion of evidence procured by unconstitutional searches and seizures
is an example. While the rationales for excluding such evidence have to do with
respect for a defendant's rights that were violated and deterrence of bad police
practices, the operation of the exclusionary rule is premised on the notion that all
evidence admitted has an impact on ajury's decision. The implication, then, is that
keeping some evidence out does change the decision somehow. Insofar as we can
draw a lesson for public reason, it seems the nature and content of justification for
a decision is in fact related to all the reasons offered.
More generally, some evidence is excluded because of its prejudicial effect.
Prejudice occurs when certain evidence arouses sympathy or hostility without
regard to its probative value. In addition, some evidence is prejudicial because it
can mislead or confuse a jury. Finally, the nature of some evidence can distract a
jury from the main issues under consideration or from other pieces of evidence.'39
One concrete example is the privilege against self-incrimination, premised on the
belief that defendants may give an erroneous impression of guilt that prejudices
their case without regard to the accuracy of their testimony. ' Here we see not only
that all evidence introduced has an effect, but also that some types of evidence
inherently are inflammatory or emotion-stroking to a degree that eclipses their
proper probative value.
The analogy to public reason is quite stark, and it raises an issue to which I shall
return. Unreasonable positions or views can provoke hostility, like inflammatory
evidence, if listeners focus on the premises that they cannot endorse. Conversely,
religious rhetoric can evoke sympathy (like evidence that inordinately plays upon
the emotions) in listeners who do in fact share the same comprehensive view. We
should at least consider (though Rawls does not) whether comprehensive views
'" PL, supra note 2, at 218.
138 See id. at 219.
139 FED. R. EvID. 403; 1 MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE 780-81 (4th ed., John William Strong
et al. eds., 1992).
'40 U.S. CONST. amend. V; 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 431-35 (4th ed., John William
Strong et al. eds., 1992).
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have such prejudicial effects. If they distract attention from political values or
arouse emotion that distorts citizens' perception of those values, then their very
presence in public reason is detrimental. Evidence of limited admissibility is
probably the closest analog to the wide view, since comprehensive reasons enter
political dialogue but do not (in Rawls's estimation) affect the justification.
Evidence often is admitted for one purpose but not for another in the same trial. In
such cases, the general rule is to admit the evidence but to explicitly instruct a jury
as to which questions it may take the evidence into account.' 4' Even if we
concluded from limited admissibility that people do have the capacity to hear
certain evidence for limited purposes without allowing it to taint their decisions on
other questions, notice how the Rules operate. Explicit instruction is necessary to
remind jurors that the admitted evidence should not affect their decision on issues
for which the evidence was not admitted. A lesson for public reason, therefore, may
be that citizens are capable of segregating their reasoning and applying reasons only
to certain questions, but that such an endeavor requires some explicit instruction on
how to do that. Again, the underlying assumption is that all reasons will be utilized
when making a decision unless there is some directive not to do so.
The general theme underlying rules of evidence is our recognition that, when
making a decision, human beings ordinarily take into account all reasons put before
them. Only with explicit instruction do we expect people to ignore reasons put
before them. However, even such instructions are insufficient where reasons are
overly emotive or distracting. The proviso lacks any explicit identification of
certain reasons as public to distinguish them from comprehensive views. Moreover,
it fails to remind listeners who hear comprehensive views that these reasons should
not be used to justify a particular result in a constitutional question. Insofar as
comprehensive views themselves do not contain reasons that others can be expected
to endorse, we should be especially mindful of their effect. That is, there may be
comprehensive views that prejudice the reasoning process, because the portrait of
the "whole truth" dwarfs the political values upon which decisions are to made.
The final problem with citizens' capacity is an amalgam of these other two.
Rawls's claim that the content of justification remains the same with the
introduction of comprehensive views depends upon the citizenry's ability to identify
the exact fit between premises and conclusions - to know which reasons are
necessary and/or sufficient to reach a particular decision. The identification of
public reasons and the severability of non-public ones is necessary in order to
comprehend the link between public reason and particular decisions - that is, one
must cling to that which is public and put aside that which is not, if only to see
exactly what premises justify a result. This is what should go on during jury
deliberation and as government officials decide or citizens vote. But once a
decision is reached, a related but slightly different capacity must be engaged.
141 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105.
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Citizens must be able to take a decision and isolate the reasoning behind it, for
public reason is both dynamic and enduring.
We can think about the capacity to comprehend the logic of justification for
constitutional essehtials and basic liberties by considering what happens after
fundamental decisions are made. The content of judicial opinions, for example,
tracks a court's reasoning, which will be used by subsequent courts to decide future
cases. The deliberation over a law affecting fundamental questions ofjustice will
inform later efforts by agencies to administer the law, by courts to interpret it, and
perhaps by citizens (often with their lawyers' advice) to comply with it. The
ratification debates over a constitutional amendment can breathe a spirit into the
rights that it secures; again, later interpretation will draw guidance from the public
reason that produced the decision to amend. Lawmakers' and citizens' efforts to
change or repeal a law affecting fundamental questions of justice will have to
understand it as a product of prior public reason; their persuasive maneuvers will
have to confront a set of public reasons that produced the status quo. When citizens
decide whether to vote for an incumbent, they must ascertain the public reasons
justifying (or not) her decisions while in office. In sum, the import of public reason
does not dissipate once a decision is made; thus, it is crucial that people be capable
of understanding the fit between premises and actions. Citizens must somehow
come to know not only whether reasons are public or not, but also which ones are
necessary and/or sufficient to justify what has been done.
Here is where the wide view of public reason becomes prickly. Not only must
citizens engaged in a current debate be able to advocate for particular conclusions,
but they must also be able to hone in on public reasons after the decision is reached
in order to decipher the justification for the law that results. Given that law's
legitimacy rests in a pedigree of procedures and reasons that draw on political
conceptions of justice, it is essential that the link to such political values be both
articulable at the time of decision and demonstrable afterwards. Why, then, should
we worry about the wide view of public reason? One reason may be that, even if
we believe that participants in political dialogue will be able identify public reasons,
separate them from comprehensive views, and then link public reasons alone to a
conclusion being urged, it might be much harder for subsequent citizens bound by
such decisions to divorce a constitutional rule from the comprehensive doctrinal
rhetoric that marked its passage. To return to my earlier example, it will be very
difficult for homosexuals to accept a decision concluding that there is no right to
same-sex marriage as a product of public reason alone if the reasoning process that
yielded the decision is sprinkled with religious fundamentalist rhetoric. How can
homosexuals recognize the legitimacy of a law (i.e., recognize that they have been
treated as free and equal citizens by a decision drawing on political values) when
the decision was made by persons who at some point in the deliberation argued
from a comprehensive view that homosexuality is an anathema?
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Rawls makes a critical (and questionable) assumption when he says that a
citizen acts reasonably by urging a particular result with a combination of
comprehensive doctrines and also public reasons (to satisfy the proviso): He
assumes that other citizens will find this mix of compreheftsive and political
arguments reasonable. While this might be the case, Rawls has seriously discounted
the effect that certain controversial comprehensive views may have. The point here
is that the justification of a constitutional conclusion has as much to do with the
reasonableness of the premises offered as it does with the rational relationship
between those premises and the conclusion itself. Whether the nature and content
of the justification are reasonable depends - in a deliberative democracy - on the
reaction of fellow citizens. We should be mindful that citizens engaged in the
throes of life may not be able to distinguish and then sever nonpublic reasons as
they deliberate. And either the salve of comforting comprehensive views or the
sting of hostile ones may make it impossible to believe that those views played no
part in the creation and operation of the current constitutional order.
C. Distinguishing Public Reason
Because I have questioned the impact of comprehensive views on the nature and
content of democratic justification, I should say a word about what might be gained
by excluding them. After all, Rawls admitted from the outset that placing limits on
public reason must be justified either as being required by rights and duties or as
advancing certain values or both.42 Public reason itself needs some instrumental
justification, it seems, to explain why citizens should resist the impulse to decide
fundamental matters based on visions of the whole truth.
It is worth remembering that an exclusive view of public reason does not
prevent the public articulation of comprehensive views. It only keeps those reasons
out bf public political debates over questions of constitutional essentials and basic
justice. Thus, the background culture and the media still provide public fora in
which religious doctrines' commitment to political values can be demonstrated.
The aim here is to think about why we might want the public political deliberation
over constitutional essentials and fundamental rights to be conducted solely within
the realm of shared political values.
The first advantage of an exclusive view is that it best enables the educative role
of public reason. A debate relying exclusively on public reasons cannot help but
educate its participants about the family of political conceptions ofjustice. While
the wide view might allow the same public reasons to come in, the exclusive view
has the advantage of focusing attention solely on that which may legitimately justify
a particular result. Thus, all reasons given in the exclusive view can be seen as
contributing to a decision, making the entire deliberation one justificatory realm for
142 PL, supra note 2, at 219.
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whatever decision results. Public reason is easier to identify, then, and citizens will
not be confused by the introduction of comprehensive views - non-premises, as
it were - with the exclusive view. One comes to what public reason is and what
public reasons are simply by paying attention to public political debates over
fundamental questions.
But the educative role for public reason is not just in citizens' passive
voyeurism of public debate. Because the exclusive view of public reason operates
solely within shared political values, it will (and ought to) spark questions about
what has been left out. When citizens hearing a debate over same-sex marriage
wonder why no mention is made about the sinfulness of homosexuality, the answer
turns out to teach the distinction between public reasons and their counterparts from
comprehensive doctrines. Omitted reasons will not always be impermissible ones,
of course. To press new reasons in an exclusive view of public reason requires that
they draw on political values. The hope is that public reason will avoid stagnation
by encouraging citizens and politicians to introduce fresh interpretations of political
conceptions ofjustice. Thus, the exclusive view of public reason teaches citizens
about the political values at the core of their social relation, and it also forces them
to think about such values when they press novel additional reasons within their
deliberative contributions.14 3
Notice finally how these two educative features - the visible realm drawn
exclusively on public reasons and the learned requirement that additional reasons
must pass the reciprocity criterion before entering the realm - elucidate the
distinction between public and nonpublic reason. In a mix of political values and
religious doctrines, it is more difficult to grasp just what is or is not included in the
justification of a constitutional result. The reason for the confusion is that a wide
view of public reason looks almost exactly like debates over ordinary political
questions and discourse in the background culture - a mix of political and
comprehensive views.
Thus, related to its educative role is the exclusive view's tendency to
distinguish itself from deliberative endeavors to which public reason does not apply.
First, there is the contrast with the background culture. While a mix of political
values and religions pervade the media and civic life, the exclusive view conducts
itself quite differently: all reasons are those which others can be expected to
endorse because they draw exclusive on political conceptions ofjustice. The wide
of public political culture is hard to distinguish from the background culture, and
the proviso does not help much because it merely produces additional public
reasons whenever comprehensive views come in. But naturally, the background
culture will have its own share of political values invoked, so there is a similar kind
of mix. Granted, the background culture will have more in the way of nonpublic
reason as private entities make their own decisions. But I am most concerned here
'43 See Lawrence B. Solumn, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1459 (1996).
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with the points at which the background culture, including mass media, takes up
fundamental questions that are or will be confronted in the public political culture
or forum.
It will be quite difficult for citizens to distinguish public political deliberation
from background cultural discourse when the two take up the same subject, such as
a constitutional right or fundamental liberty. This is due in part to the fact that what
goes on in public political dialogue may be reported to citizens through the media,
to which public reason limits do not apply. The problem is compounded, however,
when public reason includes a panoply of comprehensive views within it. At that
point, you have the same sorts of reasons in both the public political and the
background cultures; moreover, the same media may be reporting on both.
Consider, for example, newscasts that cover state legislative debates over domestic
partnership laws, court challenges by gay couples asserting a constitutional right to
marry, and churches debating whether to solemnize same-sex marriage. Certainly
the wide view cannot be blamed for the overlap, but we should ask ourselves how
public reason should operate given the convergence of issues and sources of
citizens' information about political and cultural deliberation. Most significantly,
the overlap between the background and the wide public political cultures, and the
resulting similar mix of public reason and comprehensive views, may make it
impossible to pinpoint the linkage anticipated by the proviso. It will be even harder
to make the connection between doctrines and the public reasons that come in due
course to buttress them.
The exclusive view of public reason responds to that concern by distinguishing
itself from background discourse. The proviso is inadequate because it provides
more reasons (public ones to accompany comprehensive ones) but does not
demonstrate a distinct reasoning process. The exclusive reliance on public reasons
differentiates the content of deliberation and thereby engages the citizenry solely
on political grounds. This ensures that even where public political deliberation
overlaps with the background culture or is reported by the media, citizens might at
least notice a difference and come to see the value of restricting reason.'"
A related point can be made about ordinary political issues. Recall that public
reason only applies when matters of constitutional import or basic justice are at
stake. As for ordinary political questions, there is no restriction on comprehensive
views. The virtue of the exclusive view may be that a pronounced difference in the
deliberative process - no comprehensive views or unreasonable positions at all -
will redouble attention and seriousness to the issues at hand. In other words, a
debate conducted solely in terms of shared political values may remind citizens as
well as those in government that issues of the highest order are at play. After all,
we restrict ourselves to reasons drawn from shared political values because we
'" Consider how the news media can report facts or opinions about a defendant even
though such information is inadmissible at his trial.
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recognize that our decision will add something new or different to the very
constitutional order from which we draw those values. A certain reverence
hopefully inheres in such a discussion. Those fearful of an exclusive view of
public reason should notice two features. First, the subjects covered by public
reason (constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice) can and will be
discussed in the background culture as well as assessed privately. Comprehensive
views enter both of those types of consideration. Second, such views may be
articulated throughout ordinary political discourse. The idea is simply to restrict
reason to political values when we touch issues at the core of our social compact.
Next, I take up reasons why the wide view invites resentment from citizens in a
public forum.
V. THE LISTENERS' DILEMMA IN THE WIDE VIEW
A. Sitting Through Sermons
To begin to understand why the wide view of public reason may breed more
aggravation than cooperation, it is first necessary to consider Rawls's duty of
civility. Restricting one's reasons to publicly accessible political values is one
aspect of the duty; 45 satisfaction of the proviso after introducing a comprehensive
view is another.'46 Civility "also involves a willingness to listen to others ....
It is the last feature that I wish to explore here. "Citizens learn and profit from
debate and argument," Rawls assures us. 48 Specifically, he has hopes for what can
be learned from the introduction of comprehensive doctrines. First, he argues that
citizens will recognize the roots of other doctrines' allegiance to the political
conception. 49 I have already explained why Rawls assumes more than his proviso
requires: The subsequent introduction of public reasons does not point out where
a doctrine itself either affirms shared political values or joins the overlapping
consensus on political values. Second, he argues that the fact that doctrines accept
the proviso before they enter a debate is a public manifestation of their commitment
to constitutional democracy. 0 Even if doctrines do accept the proviso, though,
there is really no public display of that commitment until the proviso is actually
fulfilled, and even then, it is not so much the commitment that is articulated as it is
a set of more reasons. Thus, there are serious questions whether the wide view has
the potential Rawls attributes to it.
145 PL, supra note 2, at 217-18.
IPRR, supra note 7, at 784.
4 PL, supra note 2, at 217.
148 IPRR, supra note 7, at 799.
149 Id. at 784.
"0o Id. at 785.
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Even more troubling, the duty of civility actually becomes a duty to listen to
comprehensive views that one does not share."' The background culture gives
citizens the chance to learn more about different doctrines and views, but the wide
view attaches a moral obligation to be exposed to them. So while no citizen is
morally obliged to subject herself to unreasonable views in civic life, the public
political culture does ask her to listen." One could argue that if liberty of
conscience and disestablishment mean anything, then citizens should be able to
participate in a constitutional debate without being subjected to another person's
comprehensive views. In other words, with the duty to listen should come
assurance that there will be no claims of "truth" tossed about, the idea being that
fundamental questions are those on which all citizens have an enhanced interest in
participation or at least awareness. It is precisely then that they ought to be free
from an atmosphere of competing truths.
Basically, it is difficult to distinguish proselytizing from public reasoning. In
a constitutional debate, citizens are not merely listing reasons; they are trying to
persuade one another to accept those reasons. When comprehensive doctrines are
introduced into such public deliberation, there is a serious chance that listeners will
perceive those views as attempts to win support for the doctrine itself as well as for
the particular constitutional conclusion being urged. The fact that there are no
limits on the way these doctrines are presented only increases the chances of this
problem. The wide view allows, if not encourages, doctrines to be "preachy," and
fellow citizens are stuck with a duty to listen.
B. Keeping Believers in Line
To these problems, Rawls offers incentives. Comprehensive doctrines "will
normally have practical reasons for wanting to make their views acceptable to a
broader audience," so it is up to the presenters to decide "how they want what they
say to be taken."' There are no requirements to make comprehensive views sound
couth within Rawls's moral duty to follow the wide view." He misses the fact that
the introduction of comprehensive views will probably not be used to win over
opponents.
Reasons that others may be expected to accept must be offered at some point
to satisfy the proviso. Those reasons are the ones that can persuade persons who
do not share the same doctrine. So why introduce the comprehensive doctrine at
all? Rawls's only answer is that the doctrine shows allegiance to political values.'"s
's, See id. at 799.
152 Id. at 800.
's Id. at 784.
15 Id.
155 Id. at 785.
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That makes little sense - reliance on political values alone would be the best
indicator that one's comprehensive view is not dictating one's position. Thus, I
would suggest that the real reason comprehensive doctrines will usually come in is
to galvanize support for the doctrine itself as well as its desired conclusion.
The doctrine's reasons only carry persuasive force for those individuals who
recognize the authority of the doctrine itself. By introducing those reasons into a
constitutional debate, advocates use the leverage of shared truths to ensure that
fellow adherents of the doctrine do not allow themselves to be persuaded by another
side's political values. This is a real possibility because presumably those political
values on the other side are reasonable ones.
Insofar as the doctrine is introduced with non-adherents in mind, one could
make the opposite assumption from Rawls's. Because there is only a slim chance
that these other citizens will be motivated by a doctrine they do not share, one may
as well throw out all the fire and brimstone one can. If nothing else, such reasons
might scare an undecided citizen into agreement. The "lesson" from Sodom is an
example of that approach.
My problem with the wide view, then, is that it injects reasons into a
constitutional debate that could stunt a citizen's ability to reorder her values. In the
case of religion, for example, some adherents might be willing to accept something
like gay rights or abortion rights based on the deliberation of public political values,
but the introduction of comprehensive views, whether intentionally or not,
manipulates that process because it puts the fear of God (so to speak) into the
discussion. Because there may be viable political values on both sides of a debate,
comprehensive reasons will make one ordering of political values seem more
reasonable to the citizen who accepts the doctrine's authority."5 The wide view
will circumvent Rawls's admonition that in evenly balanced political debates,
comprehensive doctrines ought not tip the balance.'57 This is yet another reason
why I see the wide view as a potential alteration of the content and nature of public
justification.
C. Irrefutable Arguments
's See PL, supra note 2, at lv:
The same holds for public reason: if when stand-offs occur, citizens invoke the
grounding reasons of their comprehensive views, then the principle of
reciprocity is violated .... From the point of view of public reason citizens
should simply vote for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the
most reasonable.
Id.
157 Id.
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One final element of the listeners' dilemma is an inability to publicly reject the
comprehensive doctrines to which they are exposed in the wide view: "Central to
the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive
doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible
with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity."'5 Because the wide
view itself permits the inclusion of comprehensive doctrines, public reason is not
violated. Thus, religious reasons appear immune from public criticism. This puts
listeners in a bind, because normally "[w]hen citizens deliberate, they exchange
views and debate theirsupporting reasons concerning public political questions.'
5 9
Not only must listeners figure out which reasons require subsequent justification
through the proviso, but they must also be careful not to attack those reasons in the
meantime. The tension here results from public reason's deliberative dimension.
At the very least, one would think that a citizen has a right (if not an obligation) to
tell others that she finds their reasons unreasonable. This might mean that the
others have advocated positions that do not treat fellow citizens as free and equal,
but it might also be because the reasons were premised on a comprehensive
doctrine. Recall the problem noted earlier, that citizens have no way to know
whether comprehensive views will later be buttressed by political values, so they
cannot know when to tune out an unreasonable presentation. It is impossible to
know whether a doctrine is "incompatible with the essentials of public reason," t
though, until one sees whether the proviso is satisfied. So how long must citizens
wait to criticize a doctrine? When can they be sure that the proviso will not be met?
Perhaps if Rawls permitted the criticism of any reason or doctrine put forward in
a public political debate over constitutional essentials, then citizens' complaints
might spur speakers to offer up public reasons and satisfy the proviso. As it stands,
however, the wide view invites reasons that cannot be criticized into public political
debates, forcing citizens to listen to truths they do not share and depriving them of
the ability to attack the veracity of those supposed truths.
It is this aspect of the listeners' dilemma that will prove most corrosive to
public reason. Whereas the background culture allows for comprehensive doctrines
to battle it out with criticism and competing truths, the wide public political culture
will become a haven where controversial truths can be floated without scrutiny.
Thus, what under the exclusive view could be ajustificatory realm comprised solely
of political conceptions of justice will become cluttered by comprehensive truths
that supposedly have no operative role in the justification process. Debates over
fundamentals are not the place where doctrines should be spelling out their
connection to political values. We need to keep participants focused on the
challenge at hand - given the political values we honor, what result? That process
5 IPRR, supra note 7, at 766.
9 Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 766; see also supra text accompanying note 158.
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will be obfuscated should citizens suddenly embark on discussions of how their
view of the whole truth coincides with some of these values. Worse than cluttered,
the debates may become preachy, for as long as there are public reasons sufficient
to support a conclusion, Rawls puts no limits on how doctrines are promoted within
public deliberation. And finally, where there is no hope of either winning on the
issue or convincing others that one's comprehensive view is sound, doctrines may
inject truths into political debates in order to "remind" fellow believers. Thus, the
public political culture transforms from a method of choosing a direction for
constitutional justice into a place where citizens advance.goals unrelated to the
particular question of what course to follow given existing political values. While
some of these other agendas might be laudable, as Rawls portrays the efforts to
demonstrate allegiance to democracy and quell opponents' doubts, others may not
be. We should think carefully about public reason's mission when it becomes a
locus for airing beliefs rather than persuading with political values.
VI. OTHER VERSIONS OF PUBLIC REASON
Having considered problems with Rawls's wide view, it is now worthwhile to
try to defend the exclusive view against other scholars' versions of public reason.
As will become clear, these ideals are as (or even more) permissive than Rawls,
allowing comprehensive views into public political deliberation. The upshot is that
my argument thus far in favor of keeping comprehensive views out of the debates
over fundamental matters turns out to be the outlying argument.
Notably absent from these few versions I highlight are those versions that call
for no restraint whatsoever on the introduction of religious reasons and
comprehensive views in democratic deliberation. There are two reasons for the
absence, neither of which is the notion that I am trying to make things easy for
myself. First and foremost, I think those arguments require and deserve more than
an addendum to one's primary argument. My sense is that the differences between
me and those scholars is one of kind rather than one of degree. But as will become
clear in my discussion of Michael Perry infra, my preference for the exclusive view
is not borne out of animosity toward religion. The second and related reason is that
my agenda here has been to persuade liberals who share many of Rawls's premises
to consider the pitfalls of wide and inclusive views of public reason. The scholars
below represent that sort of audience. In sum, I will let my argument loose for a
while to see if it has traction, at least with those who share my impulses, before I
endeavor to change the minds of those who think my position hostile to religion or
simply wrongheaded.
A. Audi's Secular Justification
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Robert Audi's vision is somewhat akin to Rawls's in that he wants to ensure
that the coercive power of the state is wielded only when based on proper
reasons.' 6 ' The right kind of reasons for Audi are secular ones, or those not
dependent upon the existence of God. Audian public reason is really an outgrowth
of the separation of church and state. The first component of his view is that one
has a prima facie moral obligation not to support restrictions on conduct without an
adequate secular rationale that one is willing to articulate. The second prima facie
obligation requires one not to advocate restrictions on conduct unless one is
sufficiently motivated by adequate secular reason. The first is a justification
principle that is more important than the second, a virtue principle. The more
restrictive of human conduct the law in question is, the stronger the two obligations
become. Like Rawls, Audi holds that citizens are less constrained than government
officials, who are less constrained than judges, but his ideal applies to all conduct
restricting laws, not just constitutional and basic justice questions. Audi recently
offered two interesting discourse principles that comprise a respectful civic voice.
First, one should avoid making a sociopolitical issue appear to be a religious issue.
Second, one should seek to frame any religious treatment of sociopolitical issues in
a way that avoids polarization. Moderate discourse is always to be preferred.'62
Despite his attempt to justify law on secular, non-religious grounds, he is more
permissive than Rawls in terms of what religious language may be introduced.
Comprehensive views "may figure crucially both evidentially and motivationally,
and both in general public discussion and in advocacy and support of laws and
public policies, provided (evidentially) adequate secular reasons play a sufficiently
important role."'63 Part of Audi's reluctance to purge religious language comes
from what he sees as a wide variety of usage: explicit vs. implicit religious
references; mixed vs. pure religious discourse; persuasive vs. descriptive appeals;
etc. These various uses are not amenable to a rule for the extent to which such
religious language is consistent with civic virtue. Thus, secular rationales must
exist, but they can be supplemented by religious reasons.
Unlike Rawls, Audi is mainly concerned with underlying justifications with
much less regard to public rationales put forward in deliberation. Though it is
generally best to keep discussion secular, like Rawls he sees a value in full candor,
R61 See ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
(1997) [hereinafter AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF]; Robert Audi, The Place ofReligious Argument
in a Free andDemocratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 677 (1993) [hereinafter Audi, The
Place of Religious Argument]; Robert Audi, Religious Values, Political Action, and Civic
Discourse, 75 IND. L. J. 273 (2000) [hereinafter Audi, Religious Values]. These recent works
lay out his version of public reason. His earlier work on the subject includes Robert Audi,
The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 259 (1989).
.62 Audi, Religious Values, supra note 161, at 291.
163 AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 161, at 35.
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whereby all one's reasons are disclosed. Interestingly, though, one's explanations
are relatively unimportant for Audi:
The principles of secular rationale and motivation may... be adhered to
without being stated or even consciously endorsed and may be minimally
satisfied even by those who have never heard of them or would reject them.
It is the reasons one has and one is motivated by that matter most, not what
one would say about one's reasons or about the principles those reasons
should satisfy.'"
Thus, Audi's general approval of deliberation according to secular principles turns
out to be a nice but unnecessary gloss on what he sees as the important locus of
secular reasoning - citizens' internal decision-making.
Many features of Audian public reasoning are troubling. First, I find the
public/non-public distinction much more helpful and less "ieligion-phobic" than the
religious/secular one. The virtue of an exclusive view of the Rawlsian version is
that it highlights the common fodder of social reason: shared political conceptions
of justice. Religious reasons are not excluded because they draw from a tradition
that recognizes God; rather, all comprehensive views are excluded because: (a)
they draw on doctrines that others do not share and could not reasonably be
expected to endorse; and conversely, (b) they do not draw on the shared political
values and modes of reasoning that are common to the entire polity.
A serious problem lies in Audi's willingness to allow religious reasons to play
an evidential role in justifying law (by which he means reasons in favor of one
proposal or another). Unlike Rawls, who thinks that such reasons play no operative
role where sufficient public reason exists, Audi allows for mutual justification
requiring only that "secular reasons play a sufficiently important role."' 65 At first,
it seems that I should applaud Audi for recognizing what Rawls does not: that all
reasons introduced factor into the eventual justification of law. But as becomes
clear, Audi sees the justification of law stemming not from what is said in
deliberation but from the reasons why citizens and government officials do what
they do. So while Rawls locates the justification by public reason in those political
values expressed in public deliberation (but misses the fact that comprehensive
views introduced are also part of that same deliberation and ensuing justification),
Audi locates the justification of law in private secular reasons motivating
individuals (and misses the fact that public manifestations such as voting and
deliberative discourse are the only parts of reason the citizenry can see and hear,
and thereby recognize). What Rawls and Audi have in common is that they
misunderstand that to which citizens look when seeking out the basis for, and the
164 Id. at 53.
"6' Id. at 35.
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justification of, law. Rawls assumes citizens can filter out all the reasons they do
not need. Audi assumes citizens can peer into one another's individual rationales
to be sure there is a secular nugget within. Though he includes in his obligation a
willingness to articulate secular reasons, that expression's role in reason serves
mainly to show compliance.'66 He either misses or undervalues the constructive
role of deliberation and debate, where reasons are offered up and eventually
crystallize into the justification for a decision.
This assumes, of course, that we can even read Audi to situate democratic
justification in any visible, deliberative pedigree at all. Not surprisingly, my final
criticism focuses on his claim that internal motivations rather than public
explanations are what matter most. First, I can hardly refer to Audi's vision as a
version of public reason because his aim is to secularize reasoning rather than to
publicize it. His secular rationale and motivation is not much of an attribute of
democratic citizenship to which all should aspire; it can be satisfied unwittingly
even by those who would prefer not to. I do not see how Audi believes that citizens
can repudiate those who fail to abide by secular reasoning if in fact they had no
basis to expect that such reasoning be openly and accurately articulated. And if
what is said matters far less than what is meant or done, then why should citizens
articulate their secular reasons even when they are challenged to do so by others?
Here we revisit the need to isolate the reasons necessary and/or sufficient to
justify a particular result. Rawls made the (incorrect) assumption that the content
of justification would not change with the introduction of comprehensive views
accompanying public reasons. Audi makes a different, though I think equally
flawed, assumption: that the reasons and justification of law are not dependent on
what is articulated in the public sphere - citizens and government actors need only
be sure that they are moved by their own secular reasons. As I tried to articulate in
Part IV-B, deliberation by public reason not only plays a role during the deliberation
itself (to help convince people how they should order political values to choose a
course of action), but also serves as an enduring body of reasons to which citizens
can refer during other debates now and in the future. 67 Audi is wrong about the
minimal importance of what is said because legitimate reasons (public or secular)
draw upon values, principles and reasons (political or simply non-religious) that
have been articulated before. The deliberation through which we produce law not
only allows us to justify and interpret that particular law, but also adds to the
collective body of legitimate public reasons that may be invoked in the future.
Understanding what are proper secular rationales and motives would seem
necessary in an Audian regime, so what is said ought to shape what is (and will be)
16' Audi allows for citizens to repudiate those who support government restrictions
without an adequate secular rationale and motivation. Audi, Religious Values, supra note
161, at 289.
167 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
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done and why. Audi's focus on what is done rather than what is said, and his
lackadaisical attitude toward a disparity between the two, demonstrate a
misunderstanding of the value of deliberation. It is akin to Rawls's failure to see
that the inclusion of comprehensive views in current discussions makes it difficult
to decipher the public reasons supporting a conclusion after the decision stage. 6 '
B. Greenawalt's Compromises
Kent Greenawalt is one of the most prolific writers on the subject of public
reason. His book Private Consciences and Public Reasons offers a most thorough
survey of the spectrum of ideas about public reason - far more complete than the
few versions I isolate here.'69 In addition, Greenawalt has articulated his own
"intermediate position" on public reason. 7 While Greenawalt should be credited
for his excellent synthesis of competing ideas about public reasoning, his own
particular prescription has some problems.
Most significant about his view is the conclusion that liberalismitself provides
no prescriptive theory. Greenawalt contends that the degree of self-restraint
appropriate for public reason (i.e., the degree to which citizens should refrain from
relying upon or articulating certain private reasons) depends on each society's own
history and current composition. Not conducive to either general rules of restraint
or a total absence of restraint, the United States, in Greenawalt's view, properly
embraces expectations and norms of restraint without making them too rigid.
An interesting point in Greenawalt's argument is that restraint in advocacy is
enforceable because citizens and legislators can check one another's use of
comprehensive views. Conversely, no one can be sure about private, underlying
motivations and decision mechanisms; thus, reciprocity is difficult to ensure when
it comes to the actual grounds of one another's judgment. Adding to this policing
problem, Greenawalt concedes that it is generally quite tough to free one's mind
from the push of comprehensive views. 7'
His version of public reason differs from Rawls's in two key respects. First, he
would want public reasons to be used for political debate, while allowing
168 On that last point, we can draw one helpful lesson from Professor Audi. Of religious
discourse in the public realm, he writes that "intonation and context are crucial both for
understanding the speaker (or writer) and forjudging the appropriateness of the discourse."
Audi, Religious Values, supra note 161, at 286.
169 See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBuC REASONS (1995)
[hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]. My discussion here also draws on Kent
Greenawalt, Some Problems with Public Reason in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1303 (1995). His most significant earlier treatment can be found in KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
170 GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 169, at vii.
'7' This is basically the opposite of Audi's general approach.
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comprehensive doctrines to play an internal role in individual citizens', and even
legislators', decision-making. In other words, Greenawalt is willing to accept some
disparity between the reasons advanced in public deliberation and the reasons
privately motivating those public positions. Rawls instead opted for sincerity,
hoping that the public reasons offered in the political forum and culture would be
sufficient to justify and motivate one's position.
Second, Greenawalt rejects different public reason approaches for fundamental
questions and ordinary political matters; he thinks the same norm should apply to
both types of issues. He doubts the feasibility of citizens employing separate
reasoning methods. Moreover, he argues rather convincingly that certain political
questions may not themselves be constitutional essentials, but would seriously
implicate them; it seems arbitrary to apply different reasons to these than to the
decisions over essentials themselves.
That said, Greenawalt offers a fairly straightforward set of principles. Judges
should conduct their reasoning and write their opinions solely in terms of public
reason. As for government actors and citizens, there is a distinction between
discourse and judgment. Legislators should conduct their arguments and debates
mainly with public reason, avoiding the use of premises derived from
comprehensive views. Including comprehensive views like religion in political
debates rarely helps decide an issue, and it does not produce a much deeper
understanding of religion, Greenawalt contends. Rhetoric using religious references
and imagery is permitted, though. The aim is simply to focus arguments on public
reason, though legislators may sometimes explain how comprehensive views affect
their thinking. While he concentrates on legislators, Greenawalt does mention that
administrators and executive officials should feel even more constrained to use the
discourse of public reason because they speak for all the people in a fuller sense
than representatives.
As for legislators' actual determinations, the problem is more complex because
constituents may be advancing their own comprehensive views. Greenawalt will
only say that a legislator "probably should afford more weight" to citizens'
arguments cast in public reason than in comprehensive views. ' As for reliance on
their own comprehensive views, he thinks legislators should conduct themselves
more like judges and rely on public reasons. But again he is noncommittal,
allowing legislators to decide for themselves when it is more appropriate to rely in
part on comprehensive views.
Citizens' judgment need not be based solely on public reasons, Greenawalt
concludes. To require otherwise would be too oppressive of religious liberty.
Besides, citizens have "an immeasurably slight effect on political life."'73 These
factors alone would be enough for Greenawalt to abandon any restriction on
172 GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 169, at 161.
173 Id. at 160.
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citizens' motivations; the feasibility and reciprocity concerns mentioned earlier only
secure him in the view that citizens should be able to decide based on all of their
reasons.
As for citizens' discourse, there are also few limits. Like Rawls, Greenawalt
would secure the use of any compelling reasons in background cultural discussion.
Even when citizens make their views known to representatives, the unlikelihood
that those opinions will be actively engaged, rather than duly noted, makes for little
worry about their form. When immersed in public political debate, Greenawalt
thinks ordinary citizens should use public reasons, but self-restraint is not that
important.
A tad more pressing is the case for what he calls "quasi-public citizens"
people like media commentators, editors, CEOs, heads of large civic organizations,
some law professors, and the like. These are citizens who are more sophisticated
in their understanding of public life, and who are familiar with settings where they
need to appeal to less than their own full feelings. There is some modicum of
responsibility to use public reason in their contribution to political dialogue, but
even Greenawalt finds that modicum debatable. Self-restraint for quasi-public
citizens is less important than government officials, but it matters more than for the
"ordinary Joes" of society.
On the whole, Kent Greenawalt demonstrates the "perils ofmoderation."'"7 His
normative approach is so thoroughly determined by his descriptive account of
current American deliberative norms that he inadequately theorizes the benefits and
burdens of his public reason schema. His major premise explains the convergence
between what is and what ought to be: the notion that public reason norms depend
on historical and social experience. In a way, Greenawalt's claim is like Rawls's
early explanation that a more inclusive view of public reason provided flexibility. '
The idea was that, while a well-ordered society might be able to abide by public
reasons exclusively, unjust societies or those marked by fundamental disagreement
over basic liberties might need to invoke comprehensive views.'
While the contingency and flexibility in Greenawalt and Rawls initially sounds
appealing, current practices within a society say very little about what produces
consensus on political values, what fosters allegiance to those values, what quells
doubt about others' allegiance, or what strengthens the commitment to public
reasoning in general. If a society is well-ordered, for example, Rawls thinks it
appropriate for it to invoke primarily public reasons. But such a society is well-
'71 I borrow this phrase from the title of my colleague's recent article on the freedom of
association. See Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Perils ofModeration: The Case of the
Boy Scouts, 74 So. CAL. L. REv. 119, 119 (2000).
'" "[T]he appropriate limits of public reason vary depending on historical and social
conditions." PL, supra note 2, at 251.
176 See id. at 248-52.
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ordered because it has some consensus on political conceptions ofjustice, so really
this society might be least threatened by the inclusion of comprehensive views.
Conversely, a society marked by the lack of such consensus or by deep divisions
over constitutional essentials might be most threatened by the inclusion of
comprehensive views because its political conceptions of justice do not carry
enough force to justify conclusions on their own. Thus, there is a more serious
chance that comprehensive views are figuring into the justification of some
decisions. This is most frightening for such a divisive society, because a common
reason for the inability to coalesce around an overlapping consensus of political
values is the recalcitrance of incompatible comprehensive doctrines. As such, there
would be much to fear with the introduction of comprehensive views during
fundamental decision-making deliberation in societies where anti-miscegenation
laws and the subordination of women are justified by Biblical mandate or where
religions coexist in a mere modus vivendi, always hoping to wield political control.
In sum, those doctrines may either be partial explanations justifying current unjust
conditions (as in the former societies) or they may be the very heart of profound
disagreement (as in the latter).
Having a debate over constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice may
need to be exclusively based on public reason if these societies are ever to move
past the divisions that are (if only in part) products of attitudes molded by
comprehensive views. Thus, it is not clear that Rawls's impulses about the forms
of public reason most appropriate for well-ordered and not well-ordered societies
are right - they may be exactly wrong. Whether Rawls's estimation of the needs
of different societies or my own is closer to the mark, the point is that the status of
current agreement or disagreement over fundamentals is indeterminate as to the
selection of an appropriate ideal of public reason.
With Greenawalt, the issue gets squishier because: (a) he simply wants to link
public reason to whatever practices a society has successfully employed; and (b) his
ideal of public reason is a composite of noncommittal norms and expectations,
rather than concrete ideal rules to which democracies should aspire. The problem
here is slightly different from that in Rawls, who assumed that the inclusion of more
comprehensive views better eases doubt about mutual allegiance to political values.
For Greenawalt, we must ask whether the ideal of public reason should be
constructed around a society's experience, even assuming that it is well-ordered and
has a developed set of shared political values. This seems the most appropriate
characterization of the United States right now, so the inquiry can focus on why we
should (or should not) construct an ideal based on our current deliberative
inclinations. '77
' See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 169, at 6-7 ("I argue in favor
of principles of restraint that correspond substantially with those that I claim now exist..
. ."1).
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The major problem with Greenawalt's position is that he assumes Americans
are both pleased and proud of the public reason norms that have developed,
especially the inclusion of religion. This seems questionable, even on his own
empirical evidence. For example, Greenawalt notes the general absence of explicit
religious reasons given by government officials, despite the strong likelihood that
religious motivations drive some of their positions.'78 It is from this state of the
nation that Greenawalt will later argue for a nearly exclusive idea of public reason
for government discourse, but a slippery inclusive view for officials' internal
choices on positions. He cites a convention that has emerged, arguing that disputes
by these officials should be argued in nonreligious terms.
Unfortunately, current norms are not as revealing as he would like them to be.
For while the reluctance to invoke comprehensive views in government discourse
may reflect uneasiness about their place there, it might also suggest that Americans
really doubt whether such reason should have a motivational force at all. In other
words, we might be displeased with religious argument whenever it influences
government officials, but only see evidence of that influence when it comes out in
deliberation. In other words, Greenawalt's normative conclusion is belied by his
own point that the use of public reason in debates is enforceable, whereas its private
influence is not. Americans might prefer norms that kept comprehensive views out
of both deliberation and the motivation of their officials; the primary insistence in
the deliberative sphere is merely a product of the greater ease in enforcement. In
fact, a common desire to purge comprehensive views from both the dialogic and the
evidential or motivational realms of public reason would best explain the reluctance
of government officials to use religious arguments despite broad-based religious
constituencies - officials realize that citizens prefer such arguments be kept out of
the decision-making process.
The point here is just to suggest that current practices should not, and probably
do not, have normative appeal solely because they have proved workable. The
failure of Greenwalt's explanation is that it fails to account for the possibility that
current norms do not exist because they represent what is best or what we most
think we ought to be doing. Instead, I would say that current practices represent
how close we have come to ideal deliberation so far. In other words, current
practices might reveal our impulses and how we operate on them, but they say much
less about our aspirations. While I agree with Greenawalt that American public
reason and acceptance of comprehensive views in political debates is nuanced, and
while I concede that our history has brought us to where we are, the development
and existence of nuance does not make it the desirable normative end. That we have
come to a point (and that it is not bad) does not mean that where we are is where
we sought or ought to be.
We should now look at two disparities that Greenawalt accepts. First,
178 Id. at 153-56.
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legislators and citizens are affected much differently by the force of his public
reason ideal. Because citizens' contribution to political decisions is so slight, he
feels safer in allowing comprehensive views to shape their positions and most of
their expression. The problem is that official government discourse, like legislative
debate, works in tandem with the rest of the public political culture. Legislators are
approached by individual constituents, interest groups, lobbyists, and other
legislators, but they are also influenced by the citizenry indirectly. Citizens'
arguments collectively evoke public opinion, which shapes legislators' positions on
different issues. In turn, most citizen participation in public deliberation is shaped
by what government officials say and do. Citizens know or can guess officials'
positions based on what they have voted for in the past or the statements they have
made in prior debates. Moreover, one group of citizens can gauge a legislators'
interests based on the speech of her constituents because they too know to whom
she must answer. The lesson is that political deliberation is symbiotic; the
discourse of officials and citizens both aim at and shape one another.
If that is true, then it makes much less sense to have an ideal of public reason
that operates too differently for legislators than it does for citizens. There should
be some space where the two can invoke and be exposed to the same types of
arguments, because we know that both the dialogue and the motivations of one
impact the other. The exclusive view of public reason supplies such fertile
persuasive ground. First, it asks both legislators and citizens to frame arguments
in debates over fundamentals in such as way as to: (a) draw on shared political
values; (b) avoid comprehensive views that are inaccessible by those who do not
share the same doctrine; and (c) utilize a criterion of reciprocity so that what is said
may reasonably be expected to have traction with others. Because the values are
shared, both citizens and legislators can understand and respect them. Because
ultimate decisions over constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice both
protect and constrain government officials and citizens, the same reasons should
eventually be put forward by and for all. By reserving the demands of public reason
to debates over such fundamental matters, those debates are special - like
constitutional conventions to which we are all invited. By entering, we take on
responsibilities for the good of the polity.
Thus, I would reject Greenawalt's notion that people become quasi-public
citizens (bound stronger by public reason norms) solely by the high-profile
occupations they hold. As a descriptive matter, I think it much fairer to say that
citizens take on a quasi-public character based on the issues on which they advocate
and forums in which they do so. If that is right, then any citizen entering the public
political deliberation over constitutional essentials can and should be bound by
Greenawalt's quasi-public norms. As a normative matter, I find his discussion of
quasi-public citizens offensively elitist. Why does having a public life make one
more likely to understand the demands of limited reason? While being the head of
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a large organization might force a person to act and speak politically correct - by
which I mean appease, rather than alienate, others so as to curry favor - there is
little reason to believe that the ability to limit one's speech for self-interested
purposes translates into some better capacity for limiting that speech for the sake
of a collective ideal. And public figures from Rush Limbaugh to Howard Stem tell
me that gaining a media audience hardly breeds argumentative sophistication. In
short, I think a version of public reason that exalts or restrains some citizen
contributions rather than others falls prey to the notion that there is something about
exclusive versions of public reason that is beyond the bounds of the common man.
Legislators, judges, and quasi-public citizens were all, and will again become,
ordinary citizens. While their roles may lend themselves to restraint on reasons,
there is nothing different about those persons that makes them different from the
citizenry. Thus, a change in the expectations of citizenship in one role (as advocate
in public political debate over a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice)
is not much more to ask and should not be all that different.
The second disparity in Greenawalt's view is that public reasons voiced in
government debates do not link up with actual motivations insofar as officials take
comprehensive views into account. The simple point is that if one finds such
disparity troubling, the exclusive view is the better ideal because it asks that the
reasons why one supports a position in a constitutional debate, and the reasons one
articulates for that position, both be based on public reasons. Of course, the bite of
the exclusive view is that it would keep all comprehensive views out of such
debates. As for a deeper claim that comprehensive views should have no place in
one's internal motivation, there are challenges. After all, it does seem quite difficult
for citizens to purge their doctrines from their own internal thought processes. I
find Rawls's approach convincing: One's private thoughts are like the background
culture where all reasons come in, though one should aim for sincerity in public
deliberation.
My way out of this puzzle is to re-emphasize the need for exclusive public
reason as the ideal for both citizens and government officials. All deliberation over
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice then resembles a burden no
heavier than jury duty: relying only on facts presented at trial and the law as it has
been presented. Jurors often reach verdicts they do not "like" by using the rules and
facts they are given. This solves the problem of a discrepancy between the host of
internal motives and the limited set of public reasons. While it may often be the
case that the private motives shaped by one's comprehensive view will overlap with
one's position on a fundamental matter given public reasons, that convergence is
a happy fortuity. In other words, the justification for the final result will come from
what is said and, hopefully, from why what was done was done. But even where
we suspect that non-public motives played a part in someone's position on such a
fundamental question, we give our fellow citizens the benefit of the doubt. After
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
all, they have presented adequate public reason to support their position - that
civility should be met by our own refusal to doubt their commitments. Our only
concern must be to assure one another that there is a fit between public reason
premises and the solution we advocate.
Once we focus on deliberation as the source of justification and legitimacy,
Greenawalt's point about executive officials holds for private citizens. Though they
are giving their own reasons, they are speakingfor all because their contribution to
deliberation becomes a part of the justificatory realm. Such is the lesson of the
realization that all reasons put forward in deliberative forums both motivate
decision-makers and legitimate decisions.
C. Solum's Disclosure
Lawrence Solum's work on this subject deserves comment not only because it
is so thoughtfully written, but also because it affected Rawls's own rejection of the
exclusive view. ' Like Greenawalt, he would not separate ordinary coercion by the
state from constitutional essentials; public reason applies to both.' °  His
inclinations are the opposite of Audi's: he thinks it may be impossible to purge the
causal influence of comprehensive views, so therefore, the focus should be on the
reasons articulated.'' Like the others, Solum would put no restriction on the
reasoning processes for private discussions - a laissez-faire for the background
culture, as it were. 2 He also makes a crucial point that has not elsewhere been
clearly expressed: Public reason gives a standard for self-evaluation, telling us what
reasons to forbear, but it also works as a standard for political criticism, telling what
reasons we can chide others for offering. 3 I should point out that Solum's view
is close to my own at least in one respect: He would require exclusive use of public
reasons in the deliberation of public officials in their official capacity.8 4
Solum's best contribution to the subject, and the point where we differ, rests in
his explanation of why inclusive public reason is more desirable than exclusive.
Like Rawls, he offers a positive account of the virtues that follow from exposure to
one another's comprehensive views. 5 The general feature of Solum's inclusive
179 See PL, supra note 2, at 247, n.36. In this discussion, I draw on Lawrence B. Solum,
Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1993) [hereinafter
Solum, Constructing]; Lawrence B. Solum, Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217
(1994) [hereinafter Solum,xInclusive].
180 Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 738-39.
181 Id. at 739-40.
12 Id. at 737, 752.
183 Id.
'84 Id. at 739, 753; see also infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
'" Recall Rawls's claims that arguing from comprehensive views may: (a) quell doubt
about allegiance to democratic values; and (b) demonstrate how a doctrine affirms apolitical
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view is the same as in Rawls's inclusive and wide views: one must offer sufficient
public reasons for a conclusion one urges." 6 In justifying the coercive power of the
state, we must respect the autonomy of our fellow citizens, and there are three ways
of showing that. First, give reasons "they could accept as reasonable."' 7 Second,
refrain from giving reasons they cannot accept as reasonable. s' Third, disclose all
reasons for one's own position.8 9 Solum resolves the tension between the second
and third by arguing that the second must give way; thus, full disclosure is
preferable to the withholding of religious or comprehensive views that motivate
us.190 He offers four reasons for that choice, two attacking exclusion and two
praising inclusion.
First, Solum argues that exclusion requires some intolerance. Just as public
reason tells each of us what are inappropriate reasons that we must refrain from
offering, it contains a duty that one "must" disapprove when others fail to forbear.' 9'
Solum calls this a form of limited intolerance. 92 I would challenge that
characterization. Saying reasons are not properly introduced is not a substantive
critique. There is nothing intolerant about telling people that they have gone
beyond the bounds of the rule. And consider how ironic it is to call the enforcement
of exclusive public reason intolerant: We are trying to secure reasons that all can
endorse, so that no reasons operate unreasonably by drawing on unshared premises.
Thus, it would not take much to recast the unreasonableness of comprehensive
doctrinal arguments as a form of intolerance itself. Finally, then, we note that
refraining from the introduction of non-public reasons is established as a social
good (assuming an exclusive view of public reason has been chosen). Calling on
others to exercise the degree of reciprocity seen as facilitative of that social good
is not intolerant because they, too, benefit from restraint. Even where a religious
doctrine wants to forebear forbearance and go ahead with comprehensive views on
some issue, it still benefits from other competing doctrines' restraint - both on the
issue and all the others. What Solum simply names as a species of intolerance is
nothing more than the operation of a mutually advantageous norm.
Second, Solum charges that exclusion assumes that citizens "should not even
be allowed to listen and think about the non-public reasons, because they might not
understand that the non-public reasons play only a supporting role."'93 This
conception of justice. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
"86 Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 748.
187 Id. at 750.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
'9' Id. at 749.
192 Id. at 749-50. I am not sure it is an obligation rather than an option, but this is a small
point.
19' Solum, Inclusive, supra note 179, at 228; Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 750.
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statement, made in two of his works, is fraught with misunderstanding. First, the
existence of a dynamic background culture refutes any claim that what is kept out
of fundamental debates is something citizens and legislators should not hear or
think about. The exclusive view's point is simply that debates over essentials are
not the particular places where we want that exposure and evaluation occurring.
Moreover, it is exactly because I fear that people do understand such reasons as
supplementing the justification for a particular decision that I want them kept out.
And so my claim is not that I doubt the ability of citizens and legislators to see that
sufficient public reasons justify a result even though they are supplemented; my
claim depends on that very understanding. The problem is that having sufficient
public reasons does not purge the supplemental ones, and so the justification of law
comes in some hybrid mix of public and non-public reasons. That a sufficient
portion of the justificatory mix is public does not eliminate the portion grounded in
comprehensive views.
The gist and the tone of Solum's charge also merits response. The idea is that
an exclusive view of public reason rests on skepticism about the capabilities of
citizens. Consider, though, the fact that we ask jurors not to read newspapers or
watch the news during a trial. That request is not based on a desire to keep them
from being exposed to or thinking about different perspectives; rather, the goals are:
(a) to keep focus; and (b) to produce a decision on a limited, identifiable set of
premises. No one would charge the Catholic Church with thinking its own bishops
dumb simply because it excluded from a debate before the Council of Bishops those
arguments based on Jewish or Protestant teaching. The point is simply that there
are valuable benefits and appropriate occasions for limiting, and thereby focusing,
a decision set. These are not dependent on some lament about decision-makers
thinking too much or their inability to think right. The major focus is not so much
what we keep out as it is an effort to devote all attention to what reasons we let in,
hoping for enhanced scrutiny of those.
But insofar as Solum may be right to characterize the exclusive view as a grand
effort at limiting that to which citizens are exposed or that which they consider, it
is always important to remember that the restrictions are not designed to keep
arguments away from ears or out of minds. Rather, the aim is to produce a set of
reasons that justify a fmdamental conclusion that can be accepted by all those who
affirm a political conception of justice. In a deliberative democracy, the entire
public political debate contributes to that justificatory realm. And so, for the sake
of focusing attention on only those reasons that we hope have operative force and
for the sake of producing a complete set of reasons in that debate, we opt for the
exclusive view.
The final two of Solum's arguments applaud features of an inclusive view.
First, inclusion breeds tolerance.'" This is the flip side of his claim that the
19 Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 748.
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exclusive view requires citizens to object to the introduction of certain non-public
reasons, which he sees as a bit of intolerance.' 95 In the end, he concludes that a
system of public reason that promotes tolerance is more desirable, and so the
inclusive version wins out over the exclusive.'" But I would at least question just
how tolerant the inclusive view is. We know that non-public reasons could not
carry the day on their own, so their inclusion may be something like a red-headed
stepchild at the family reunion. That is, agreeing upon a norm of admission
includes no endorsement other than the minimal right to speak certain views. But
even if these views are welcomed and not just included, I find it hard to praise the
system. Solum apparently equates toleration of arguments with listening to them,
but we know that there is a moral duty to listen. Further, listening to comprehensive
views is not all that goes on: an opponent can fire right back with her own
comprehensive views. This begins to look like the background culture.
While it is true that we tolerate all kinds of reasons insofar as the First
Amendment keeps us from using government to squelch them, it is not at all clear
that competing comprehensive views are all that tolerant of one another's speech.
And if they are, then tolerance might be rather thin. I might even go so far as to
characterize the possibility that religions share in an overlapping consensus (i.e., it
is not just a modus vivendi), and they affirm a principle of free speech, but they do
not care much at all for the religious speech of other sects. Now to the extent that
they do not try to have government stamp it out, they are tolerant. And to the extent
that they affirm from within their comprehensive views of the good and political
conceptions of justice that free speech is desirable, they are tolerant. But one gets
the feel from Solum that there is something more to this tolerance of which he
writes. If so, I think he is overestimating what his inclusive view requires. If not,
then it is unclear to me why one could not make the claim that one shows tolerance
by restraining one's use of controversial ideas of the good. That is, we could be
tolerant by listening, but we could also be tolerant by not pushing our
comprehensive views. If so, then greater restraint is a greater boon to tolerance:
a mutual reliance on those political premises we share. Deliberation in the public
political culture under the exclusive view of public reason, then, should be an
exemplar of tolerant political discourse.
I anticipate a response that tolerance means a willingness to accept ideas and
ways of life that are different, and so a tolerance of reliance on what we have in
common is rather thin itself. Allowing in more of what is not shared is truly more
tolerant. Touch6. But if that is right, then we might question whether tolerance is
a proper value to promote at all in public political deliberation over constitutional
essentials. Solum never does that; he just cites the tolerance-promoting features of
an inclusive view as an obvious reason for its superiority over the supposed iimited
'95 Id. at 749-50.
196 Id. at 750.
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intolerance associated with the exclusive view.'97 I would say that when matters
touch on the core of the social contract - the heart of matters of justice - then
there are at least three related goals far more important than tolerance: persuasion;
consensus; and the construction of a clearly identifiable justificatory realm. In
various places, this article offers reasons why the exclusive view makes sense for
each of these. Briefly, persuasion is most likely where all sides can embrace a set
(albeit a limited one) of mutually acceptable premises; the exclusive view asks that
all reasons put forward in debate be reasonable ones. Consensus on one component
of the Constitution or on one basic liberty probably should have some relationship
to the points of consensus underlying the rest of our agreements on the Constitution
and on justice; the exclusive view utilizes reasons from those agreements, and is
thereby easily situated within a constitutional tradition. Because the work of
persuasion and consensus are never done, we need an identifiable realm of reasons
that we understand as grounding each particular decision over fundamentals. This
is especially so because such fundamentals are usually decided on broad terms that
must be digested by the public and further elaborated by administrators, judges, and
legislators. Debates carried on solely in terms of public reason have the virtue of
providing a necessary and sufficient set of reasons, the record of which will not only
shape the application of the particular decision but will also add to the body of
political values that will later be used as public reasons themselves.
Finally, Solum contends that the inclusive view is sometimes necessary to stop
evil, as in the case of the abolitionists or Martin Luther King, Jr., who both used
Christian rhetoric. 9 ' This rationale is worth mentioning because Rawls has
consistently picked up on it.'" Obviously, there were public reasons available to
gird these heroic figures' arguments, whether or not they used them. The problem
I see is that it seems just as likely that comprehensive views can be introduced to
justify that which is evil.
Take as a given the fact that the primary evil in the pre- 1 860s and pre- 1 960s
American societies was African American inequality. Could we not see inequalities
today that are justifiable in religious terms? Surely the homosexual question
suggests that we are experiencing just that. Regardless of whether one thinks
homosexuality is or is not a sin, is or is not normatively desirable, is or is not
natural, one must admit that proscriptions of homosexual conduct and the overall
absence of gay equality measures are rooted in religious beliefs. And so if one can
even grant that someday America might consider the legal and cultural treatment of
homosexuals an affront to equality or an evil, we would then have a case where
religions promoted an evil outcome rather than stopped one. We can see the same
possibility for non-religious comprehensive views as well. Imagine that a
'9' See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
"g Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 751.
'99 See PL, supra note 2, at 247-51, lii; IPRR, supra note 7, at 785-86.
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comprehensive utilitarian urges his views in public political debate over abortion
and claims (a) that a fetus is not a being with interests that even enter into the utility
calculus, or (b) that even if all fetuses have interests, those are outweighed by
women's happiness in choosing not to bear children and by the relieved social
responsibility for unwanted children. If one can even grant that someday America
might consider abortion an evil form of infanticide, then again we would have a
case where a comprehensive view promoted an evil outcome rather than stopped
one. Thus, I find the anti-evil/flexibility argument indeterminate.
I want to take up Solum's explanation for his partial endorsement of the
exclusive view: He would constrain government officials' arguments in their
official capacity to public reasons only.200 He offers two justifications. First, these
offices were entered voluntarily, and so officials should accept the burden of public
reason.20 1 Second, they still have freedom to speak as private citizens, so the burden
is itself limited.0 2 Each of these considerations apply in some respects to citizens
as well, so I hope to use them to advance my argument that exclusive public reason
is good for citizens, too, in debates over constitutional essentials and fundamental
matters.
First, just as officials enter government voluntarily, citizens freely participate
in public political deliberation. If we think that there is something in the nature of
taking up the task of making political decisions that carries a special responsibility
with it, then it is hard to draw a bright line between, say, legislators and citizens.
Just as officials choose to take ajob, citizens choose to weigh in on certain matters.
Second, if citizens who enter government can have two capacities (official and
private) with two levels of restraint (a lot and none), then why should we not
imagine different levels for citizens who take on decision-making capacity at the
margins? Obviously, Solum does not think it impossible to be of two voices, even
if one cannot be of two minds when faced with a political question - one voice
bound by dictates attendant to the job and one voice free to reason at will. My
exclusive view makes it quite easy for citizens in that regard because entrance into
particular forums on particular issues triggers the restraint on nonpublic reasons.
And just as Solum reminds us, citizens will remind one another when it is
appropriate to use solely public reasons. The point about public reason providing
a standard not only for personal forbearance, but also for political criticism, goes
far toward undermining claims that citizens cannot distinguish either where or on
what subjects they are supposed to leave non-public reasons out. None of us need
bear the burden of the reciprocity criterion alone, because we all police the
borderline between reasonable and unreasonable views.
200 Solum, Constructing, supra note 179, at 739, 753.
201 Id. at 753.
202 Id.
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D. Perry's Scrutiny of Religious Reasons
Michael Perry has produced a great deal of thoughtful scholarship on the
question of appropriate reasons, but his perspective is special as it comes from a
devout Catholic who is wary of what he calls "'God'-tak."203 Perhaps the most
unique feature of Perry's contribution is his claim that we should welcome religious
arguments in the public sphere so that we can test them there.2° Unlike Rawls's
reluctance to have comprehensive views criticized, Perry wants them evaluated just
like any other political reason offered in deliberation. This is part of an
"ecumenical dialogue" designed to draw religions away from the "temptations of
infallibilism."2 °5 Like other scholars, however, Perry contends that "citizens should
forgo reliance on a religious argument" (or at least be wary) unless they are
motivated by an independent secular reason.20 6
He offers a clear, rather compelling set of reasons for that approach. First, he
considers it impossible to maintain separation between religious argument in the
background culture and in public political debate. 207 Second, "[r]eligiously-based
moral argument is not necessarily more . . . divisive than secular moral
argument." 208 Third, it "is not necessarily less deliberative."2°9 Fourth, the
influence of religious argument makes it important to have it tested in political
debate.2 " Finally, we must "let ourselves be tested by [the religious argument of
others] .211
As my inclinations in the earlier discussion of Greenawalt may have indicated,
I recognize the difficulty of asking citizens to split apart the public and
comprehensive aspects of their internal, actual motivations. I fimd myself convinced
by Perry that mixed motives are acceptable, as long as there exists a secular (or for
me, public) reason to support one's position. Thus, my version of the exclusive
view limits itself to the public political dialogue. After all, my claim is that the real
203 Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
48 (1998) [hereinafter Perry, Democracy]. Most of my discussion is drawn from this recent
article, because Perry's own views have undergone slight change. See MICHAEL PERRY,
LOVE AND POWER (1991); MICHAELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN PoLmncs: CONSTrTUTIONALAND
MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice:
Further Thoughts - And Second Thoughts - on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
703 (1993).
0 Perry, Democracy, supra note 203, at 5.
203 Perry, Democracy, supra note 203, at 12 (quoting MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW 183 (1988).
206 Perry, Democracy, supra note 203, at 20.
207 Id. at 13.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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justification for a constitutional decision rests in the reasons offered in the public
political deliberation; what is said there becomes the justificatory realm. Thus, I
will accept a degree of disparity between citizens' internal mixed public/non-public
motivations and their public advocacy in the political forum.
What I cannot accept is Perry's call for the testing of comprehensive views in
the public political domain, and so I will defend the exclusive view against such
inclusiveness. I may seem to be contradicting my earlier position where I
complained about the listeners' dilemma - the duty to listen to comprehensive
views accompanied by a duty not to attack or criticize them. Perry does solve the
dilemma by letting those views in but also subjecting them to contest. I find myself
troubled by the implications of that approach, though, and it is here that I hope to
offer an innovative reason in favor for exclusive public reason.
I do not think that public political debate over constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice is a place where comprehensive views should be criticized
or questioned. These are debates that go to the core of citizenship, and so most
everyone individually - as well as being part of the polity - has a stake in their
resolution. But comprehensive views go to the core of citizens' conception of the
good life. I reject any deliberative method over fundamental constitutional issues
that would have as part of it any denigration, or even counter-argument, against
doctrines that comprise the heart and soul of certain citizens.
My impulse here is quite consistent with my overarching critique of inclusive
and wide views of public reason. First, because all citizens have a stake in, or at
least should have an opinion on, fundamental matters, there is every reason to want
maximum participation. But entry into the political arena in these issues ought not
open a person up either to competing truth claims that cannot help but sound
preachy or to criticism of one's own comprehensive view that cannot help but
sound hostile. In other words, the inherently persuasive character of such political
debate makes comprehensive views sound like they are looking to convert citizens
(figuratively if not literally) and makes criticism of those views sound like a denial
that they could be true. My agreement that there is a duty to listen in these debates
compels me to exclude what I might call "anti-comprehensive views."
So too does my understanding of deliberation as producing ajustificatory realm
for a decision. I cannot endorse a realm of reasons for any constitutional or basic
justice result that includes an explicit denial of the truth of citizens' beliefs. Of
course, there will be implicit denials, as when the decision to strike down anti-
miscegenation statutes denies the truth of the claim by some believers that God
wanted to keep the races pure. But the point here is that, by keeping out
affirmations of belief from the body of reasons, we also keep out their specific
denials or negations. And so, just as I find repugnant the religious belief that people
of different races ought not marry or reproduce, I find equally repugnant a
constitutional debate that would have me express my repugnance! I mean to keep
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comprehensive views, and especially religious views, out of public political debate
not to demean or marginalize those views, but to keep them insulated from attack.
The decision over a constitutional essential or a matter of basic justice should never
have within its supporting premises the explicit, intentional advancement or
negation of any comprehensive conception of the good life. While comprehensive
views may be promoted or attacked in the background culture or even in everyday
politics, the same should not occur under the rubric of what we consider
fundamental decision-making.
In the end, the questions and debates covered by public reason are those by
which we re-write a portion of our social contract. All the language in that contract
can and will, in turn, become the future language of public reason. Unfortunately,
though, the process is not like writing on a page where one can scratch out or erase
the superfluous and the unwanted. Drafting the language of this social contract is
a dynamic endeavor comprised of what is put forward and what is comprehended.
We cannot erase what we have heard and scratch out what we have read. Try as we
might, reasons endure. And to keep some of those reasons out of our contract, we
must leave them off the drafting table.
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